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ABSTRACT 
Hospitals and physicians are often required to adapt their operations in response 
to macro changes in their industry environment. This dissertation examines the 
operational factors which influence and incentivize changes in hospital and physician 
operating performance. The first essay in this dissertation investigates how legislative 
political support and competition in the area in which a hospital operates influences 
hospitals’ investments and commitment to complying with performance mandates 
implemented by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) legislation in the 
United States. Leveraging United States hospital performance data from 2007 to 2014, 
results indicate a differential impact of government ideology on recently introduced 
patient experience metrics versus traditional clinical metrics. These findings contribute to 
the research regarding the impact of firms’ operating environments on the effectiveness 
of industry policy adoption, particularly in situations where future uncertainty of existing 
legislative mandates is high. 
The second essay in this dissertation focuses on the unintended impacts to 
physician opioid prescribing behavior created by the passage of the ACA. This study 
aims to enhance our understanding of the factors associated with opioid prescription 
behavior and provide prescriptive insights to reduce opioid prescribing, which serves as 
the principal gateway to opioid addiction. Specifically, this study examines how 
v 
prescriber workload, introduction of the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program, 
and market competition influence opioid prescribing. Results demonstrate an increase in 
opioid prescription rates following the introduction of the VBP program, along with a 
moderating impact of prescriber workload and market competition on opioid prescription 
rates. These findings inform the discussion on the health and societal impacts of the 
opioid epidemic in the United States, while providing prescriptive implications to 
hospital managers, prescribers and policymakers about the influence of operational and 
competitive factors on opioid prescription rates. Together, these studies provide empirical 
support for the influence of operational factors on hospital and physician responses to 
environmental changes in the US healthcare industry.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 drastically altered 
the United States healthcare industry, ushering in sweeping changes aimed at 
transforming the US healthcare industry from a fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance 
environment (Werner et al. 2011). Among the many policy changes included within the 
ACA were reimbursement programs designed to financially incentivize hospitals and 
physicians to modify their operating behavior towards a focus on improving clinical and 
experiential quality. Shifting towards a new payment model required hospitals to invest a 
significant amount of nonrecoverable financial and human resources to maintain 
compliance with new regulations, particularly with regard to non-traditional performance 
measures (Merlino and Raman 2013, Levinson et al. 2010).  
The ACA was, and continues to be, a highly contested piece of legislation, 
enduring routine attempts at repeal and amendment (Rovner 2018, Collins et al. 2017). 
Such ongoing debate induces considerable uncertainty about the future viability of the 
ACA, rendering hospitals and physicians to carefully consider the most appropriate 
manner with which to alter their operating behavior. Evidence exists to support the belief 
that organizations will uniformly adapt to new industry regulation imposed by 
policymakers (Shaffer 1995), yet the presence of environmental uncertainty raises the 
possibility that organizations may differ in how they implement policy changes which are 
unlikely to remain in effect (Li et al. 2017). 
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With this in mind, this dissertation seeks to examine first, how hospitals weigh the 
decision to invest in complying with industry policy which may not be applicable in the 
future. More specifically, which factors in hospitals’ operating environments influence 
the degree to which hospitals invest in complying with the ACA’s operational 
performance mandates. To investigate this research question, a longitudinal study is 
conducted which analyzes US hospital performance data across an eight year period. 
Reliant upon existing research that informs the factors influencing adoption of public 
policy, the empirical analysis tests the impact of both external institutional forces (Guler 
et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016), and forces internal to the firm (Berry and Berry 1992). 
Relevant to the dichotomous operational performance domains imposed by the 
passage of the ACA, prior healthcare operations research has demonstrated tradeoffs 
between clinical and experiential quality (Senot et al. 2016, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012), 
such that a focus on one performance domain may be disadvantageous to the other. 
Following such evidence, this dissertation extends the analysis of the impact of hospitals 
operating environments on investments to comply with legislative mandates to examine 
differential impacts to each distinct performance domain. 
Although the ACA and its associated programs primarily focused on establishing 
a link between hospital operational performance and hospital reimbursement, 
examinations of physician contracting structures indicates alignment between physician 
and hospital reimbursement structures (SullivanCotter 2018, American Medical Group 
Association 2017). That is, hospitals have restructured the contracts of the physicians in 
their employ to mirror the reimbursement mechanisms provided to hospitals by the ACA. 
While hospitals and physicians have traditionally been aligned in focusing their efforts on 
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continuously improving clinical quality (Levinson et al. 2010), the addition of financial 
incentives and public monitoring, both of which are proven to be effective methods for 
altering individual behavior (Song et al. 2018, Tosi et al. 1997), has jointly induced 
pressure on physicians to place an emphasis on patient satisfaction.  
 Although existing research is limited in its examination of the relationship 
between incentivizing patient satisfaction and prescribing practices, some evidence exists 
to suggest an association between patient satisfaction and the denial of patient requests 
for prescriptions (Jerant et al. 2018, Calcaterra et al. 2017, Kelly et al. 2016). A more 
thorough analysis of this relationship is particularly relevant given that patient pain 
management is one of the domains incentivized within the focus on experiential quality. 
With this in mind, and against the backdrop of the opioid epidemic underway in the US 
(Scholl et al. 2019, Frazier et al. 2017), this dissertation next seeks to investigate the 
impact of the ACA’s reimbursement program, the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) 
program, on opioid prescribing rates in US hospitals. To investigate this research 
question, a longitudinal study is conducted which analyzes the trends in opioid 
prescribing rates amongst hospital based physicians before and after the implementation 
of the VBP program.  
 Taken together, this dissertation examines the operational impacts to the US 
hospital industry following the implementation of legislation which incentives hospitals 
and physicians to improve clinical and experiential quality performance. Findings inform 
the discussion on the effectiveness of industry policy implementation in the US 
healthcare industry as well as its impacts to the operating behavior of hospitals and 
physicians. 
 
4 
CHAPTER 2 
GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY AND RESPONSES FROM HOSPITALS 
TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LEGISLATION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 ushered in 
sweeping changes to the United States healthcare industry. Grounded in the goal of 
transforming the US healthcare industry from a fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance 
environment (Werner et al. 2011), the ACA introduced a reimbursement program which 
financially incentivized hospitals to improve both clinical and experiential quality. 
Although hospitals have traditionally focused on continuously improving clinical quality 
(Levinson et al. 2010), experiential quality was a newly introduced performance measure 
(Groopman 2008) which required hospitals to undertake significant investments of 
financial and human resources (Lynn et al. 2015, Merlino and Raman 2013).  
Following passage of the ACA, the legislation has endured constant opposition 
and multiple Congressional votes aimed at repealing or substantially amending the 
foundational components of the law, including a Supreme Court review of the 
constitutionality of the law along with a successful 2017 repeal of the ACA’s individual 
insurance mandate (Rovner 2018, Collins et al. 2017). Given the considerable uncertainty 
associated with the future viability of the ACA and recognizing that investments to 
comply with industry policy are often nonrecoverable (Parkhe 1993), hospitals may be 
concerned with investing significant levels of resources to comply with its operational 
performance mandates. Such concerns are likely exacerbated by an ACA mechanism 
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which imposes financial penalties to hospitals for noncompliance with its operational 
performance mandates. 
Prior research examining the adoption of public policy establishes that adoption 
rates are strongly influenced by both external institutional forces, such as federal 
legislative pressure (Guler et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016), and internal determinants, 
such as regional political and social factors (Berry and Berry 1992).  Evidence also exists 
that organizations may differ in the degree to which they feel the need to implement 
industry changes that are perceived as unlikely to remain in effect (Li et al. 2007). Given 
these competing beliefs regarding which factors are most relevant to industry policy 
adoption, particularly under environmental uncertainty, we set out to answer the 
following research question: What are the characteristics of hospitals’ operating 
environments that influence their likelihood to invest in complying with industry 
mandates which may not remain in effect in the future?  
In addition, prior healthcare operations research has found evidence of tradeoffs 
between clinical and experiential quality (Senot et al. 2016, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012), 
such that a focus on one may be detrimental to the other. Building upon evidence of this 
tension between the two types of performance quality incentivized by the ACA, we also 
seek to answer the following research question: Do the characteristics of hospitals’ 
operating environments differentially impact the likelihood to invest in complying with 
the various types of performance mandated by industry policy? 
To explore these questions, we analyzed performance data from 3,078 short stay 
and critical access hospitals for the eight year period from 2007 – 2014. Our results 
reveal that political support for the ACA in the area where a hospital operates influences 
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the degree to which hospitals invest in complying with the ACA’s operational 
performance mandates, but only for newly introduced performance metrics. Specifically, 
hospitals operating in areas that support the ACA are more likely to invest in improving 
their experiential quality scores than their peers operating in areas that do not support the 
ACA. However, we find no impact of political support for the ACA on investments in 
more traditional clinical quality performance metrics. We also find evidence of the 
influence of hospitals’ competitive environments on both types of operational 
performance. Post hoc testing further indicates the influence of ACA political support on 
experiential quality performance rates of change over time, providing support for the 
notion that hospitals are altering their rate of investments in compliance over time. 
In examining these relationships, we contribute to the literature by establishing 
the impact of firms’ operating environments on compliance with industry legislation. In 
doing so, we provide evidence of firms seeking information from their political 
environment for signals about how to respond to industry legislation. These findings have 
implications for the effectiveness of legislative policy implemented without bipartisan 
support, which may impact economic growth and quality improvement within industries. 
Our findings also have implications for industry leaders such that limiting investment in 
legislative mandates which are liable to change may free up resources to be invested in 
alternative operational areas. 
2.1 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.1 Affordable Care Act Legislation and Hospital Performance 
Since the ACA was signed into law in 2010, the healthcare industry has endured a 
continuous period of flux and uncertainty (Becker’s Hospital Review 2013, Deloitte 
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Center for Health Solutions 2017). The ACA was a non-bipartisan legislation, supported 
and passed by the Democratic Party and strongly opposed by the Republican Party in the 
United States (111th United States Congress 2009-2010). The strong opposition and 
multiple calls to repeal the ACA introduced considerable uncertainty regarding the future 
viability of the Act, especially in the event of a change in the political administration in 
power. Since the passage of the ACA, opposition has included a 2012 Supreme Court 
ruling to uphold its constitutionality, numerous Congressional votes aimed at repealing 
the foundational tenets of the Act, and a successful repeal of the individual insurance 
mandate in 2017. 
The ACA included a directive to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to establish a Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program under which 
value-based incentive payments are made in a fiscal year to hospitals that meet specified 
performance standards for both clinical quality of care and patient experience (111th US 
Congress - H.R.3590, Section 3001). Failure to meet specified performance targets is to 
result in the withholding of Medicare reimbursement, effectively creating financial 
penalties for underperforming hospitals.  
The VBP program operationalized clinical quality through a metric known as 
conformance quality (CQ), which measures a hospital’s adherence to evidence-based best 
practices for patient care (Garvin 1987, Senot et al. 2016, Senot et al. 2016, Sharma et al. 
2016). Research indicates that implementing these practices leads to improvements in 
patient outcomes (Chassin et al. 2010). While hospitals have traditionally focused on 
conformance quality (Levinson et al. 2010), patient experience is a relatively new 
performance domain that has struggled to receive broad support from clinicians 
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(Groopman 2008). Patient experience encompasses the quality of communication 
between the patient and caregivers regarding care delivery, as well as the quality of the 
ambiance and amenities provided during their hospital stay (Bechel et al. 2000). To 
capture patient experience, also known as experiential quality (EQ), CMS relies on 
results from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(HCAHPS) survey.  
Improving EQ is a challenging task for hospitals for several reasons. First, 
improving EQ primarily depends on the commitment of front line service workers (i.e. 
nurses and physicians) to patient communication and responsiveness (Levinson et al. 
2010). Quantifying and identifying EQ improvement opportunities can also be difficult, 
requiring extensive investment of financial and human resources by hospitals (Lynn et al. 
2015, Merlino and Raman 2013). As an example, to improve EQ performance, the 
Cleveland Clinic invested approximately $11 million to implement a mandatory training 
program for all employees and instituted mandatory hourly nursing rounds to check on 
patient needs (Merlino and Raman 2013).  
Given the expenses and substantial cultural shift associated with improving EQ 
performance, hospitals would likely prefer not to commit resources towards complying 
with the EQ performance mandate until necessary. In the following sections, we consider 
how various components of hospitals’ operating environments influence the decision to 
invest in complying with operational performance mandates incentivized by the ACA.  
2.1.2 Real Options and Legislative Uncertainty 
Real options theory provides a framework for understanding how organizations 
make commitments to strategic actions and allocate scarce resources (McGrath et al. 
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2004). The value of real options is tied to information related to uncertainty in an 
investment’s value. One option that can benefit organizations is the opportunity to delay, 
or limit, investment, since deferring commitment of resources offers the strategic 
flexibility of waiting until additional information can be incorporated into investment 
decisions (Li et al. 2007). The decision to withhold investment is most valuable when 
investment decisions are nonrecoverable and greatly reduce the value for alternative use 
(Parkhe 1993).  
In our context, we focus on uncertainty related to the ACA legislation, or 
legislative uncertainty. We define legislative uncertainty as the lack of clarity that exists 
regarding the future of legislation requiring compliance by hospitals. Legislative 
uncertainty is important to hospitals’ real options value for three reasons. First, ACA 
mandates impose costs of compliance on hospitals without corresponding direct positive 
changes in cash flow. At the same time, ACA directives include penalties for 
noncompliance. When costs of compliance outweigh penalties for noncompliance, it is 
rational for hospitals to seek to delay complying with ACA mandates. Second, the degree 
to which the future of ACA mandates is uncertain influences the expected cash outflows 
for noncompliance. That is, when hospitals believe the ACA will be repealed, the 
expected value of potential costs for noncompliance are reduced and the option to limit 
compliance increases in value. Finally, investments in compliance represent an 
opportunity cost, where scarce financial resources allocated to compliance trade off with 
other investment options. If the ACA were to be repealed, hospitals could not revisit prior 
compliance investment decisions to reallocate those resources to more productive uses, 
rendering the costs of investing in compliance as nonrecoverable (Parkhe 1993).  
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Building on the literature which investigates options under future uncertainty, we 
suggest that hospitals operating in environments that support repeal of the ACA should 
have a discounted value of noncompliance costs relative to compliance costs. As such, 
we expect these hospitals to delay investments in compliance. In contrast, hospitals 
operating in environments that support maintaining the ACA will not delay investments 
in compliance. In the following section, we consider various factors in hospitals’ 
operating environments which influence investments in compliance with, and ultimately 
performance on, ACA performance domains. 
2.1.3 Political Support for Legislation 
Due to a lack of bipartisan support for the ACA, and the divisive nature of 
political sentiment in the US, the level of political support for the ACA in the area in 
which a given hospital is located is likely to influence a hospital’s perception of the 
legislation’s future and, relatedly, the degree to which the hospital invests in its 
compliance with its performance directives. Consistent with this argument, researchers 
studying adoptions of public policy argue that adoption rates are strongly influenced by 
two factors: external institutional forces such as federal legislative pressures, and internal 
determinants such as lower level political affiliation. Scholars further argue that there 
could be potential adoption synergies or tensions between these factors depending on 
whether there is alignment between these forces (Berry and Berry 1992). From an 
external standpoint, financial penalties for noncompliance lead to institutional pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Guler et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016) which can influence 
investments in initiatives to federal legislative directives. For example, healthcare studies 
demonstrate that hospitals implement quality improvement initiatives, following 
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legislation mandating public reporting on such metrics, even when they are not ready to 
do so (Hibbard et al. 2003, Tu and Cameron 2003).  
However, internal determinants of adoption based on more regional political and 
social factors can also overpower external determinants (Berry and Berry 1992). For 
instance, in a study of greenhouse gas reduction across 900 US cities, Krause (2011) 
found that regional political characteristics had a strong association with local leaders’ 
decisions to sign a climate protection agreement. Such evidence suggests that regional 
political characteristics may influence hospital decisions regarding compliance with a 
federal policy. That is, when the political environment in the area where the hospital 
operates supports the ACA, the hospital may suffer consequences if it fails to comply 
with the ACA’s performance directives, decreasing the value of the option to limit 
investment. Alternatively, when the political environment does not support the ACA, the 
option to delay, or limit, investment in compliance is more valuable. Concisely, when a 
hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will remain in place, hospitals are 
more likely to invest in complying with its performance mandates; however, when a 
hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will be repealed, hospitals are less 
likely to invest in complying with its performance mandates. 
As noted previously, the ACA mandated two distinct domains to measure hospital 
operational quality performance (Young 2017). EQ is a recently introduced performance 
domain in the hospital setting which mandates a focus on the interaction between 
caregivers and patients, as viewed from the patient’s perspective (Chandrasekaran et al. 
2012). Due to the considerable investment of financial and human resources required by 
hospitals to shift their focus toward improvements in EQ (Lynn et al. 2015, Merlino and 
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Raman 2013), hospitals may favor limiting their investments in EQ if their political 
environment suggests that the legislation is likely to be repealed. Conversely, when a 
hospital’s political environment suggests that the legislation will remain, hospitals have 
no incentive to delay investments in EQ compliance. 
In contrast, since hospitals have traditionally focused on CQ (Levinson et al. 
2010) and evidence indicates that such practices lead to improvements in patient 
outcomes (Chassin et al. 2010), hospitals should universally invest in improvements to 
CQ. As such, the political environment within which a hospital operates should have no 
impact on compliance with CQ performance mandates. Accordingly, we introduce the 
following hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 1a: Hospitals operating in states that support the ACA will have higher 
experiential quality (EQ) performance.  
Hypothesis 1b: State political support for the ACA will have no impact on hospital 
conformance quality (CQ) performance.  
2.1.4 Competition 
A second important consideration in determining the value of limiting investment 
in response to ACA mandates are the decisions of competitors to invest in compliance (Li 
et al. 2007). In the healthcare setting, distance is an important consideration for patients 
seeking medical care (Tay 2003). Thus, competition among hospitals is geographically 
constrained. Competition is generally thought to promote investments in activities aimed 
at achieving differentiation (Ocasio 1997). At the same time, it also creates a bandwagon 
effect (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993), where firms imitate the actions of their 
competitors. Failing to invest in legislative mandates may leave one hospital behind its 
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competition, decreasing the value of the option to limit investment (Kester 1984). These 
mechanisms in combination could influence investments to support legislative directives 
within a competitive market. 
Although research indicates that investments in quality that is easily observed and 
understood by customers are likely to have a higher impact than improvements in 
difficult to observe clinical metrics (Goldman and Romley 2008, Propper et al. 2007), the 
ACA linked financial incentives (penalties) to both experiential and clinical quality 
performance. Hence hospitals may financially suffer by limiting investment to comply 
with legislative mandates on both types of quality metrics if their competition chooses to 
do so. Further, the ACA commissioned public reporting of hospital performance scores, 
providing hospitals with access to the performance of their local competitors. Given the 
localized nature of competition in the healthcare sector and the availability of competitor 
performance information, it is likely that hospitals will attempt to imitate competitor 
actions related to both EQ and CQ performance. Thus, hospitals that face higher levels of 
market competition will be more likely to invest in both performance domains mandated 
by the ACA, leading to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Hospitals operating in highly competitive environments will have 
higher experiential quality (EQ) performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: Hospitals operating in highly competitive environments will have 
higher conformance quality (CQ) performance.  
2.1.5 Impact of Competition on the Relationship between Political Support for 
Legislation and Hospital Performance 
Perceptions of the future of the ACA are likely to bound the value of the option 
hospitals can exercise in the face of competitor actions. Research notes that uncertainty 
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has a discouraging effect on investments under less competitive pressure (Guiso and 
Parigi 1999). As such, we suggest that high levels of competitor actions will overpower 
the relationship between government ideology and hospital performance. The localized 
nature of competition in healthcare creates the potential for significant financial losses if 
patients migrate to hospitals with better performance. Therefore, competitive forces are 
likely to lead hospitals to imitate competitor actions related to performance, regardless of 
the political environment within which the hospital is operating. Hence, when 
competitors invest in improving operational performance, the option to limit investment 
decreases in value regardless of the prevailing political environment in which the hospital 
operates. 
Further, based on our prior arguments for H1b that the political environment in 
which a hospital is operating will have no impact on compliance with CQ performance 
mandates, we believe that competition will only influence the relationship between a 
hospital’s political environment and its compliance with EQ performance mandates. 
Accordingly, we introduce our final hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3a: Competition attenuates the relationship between state political 
support for the ACA and experiential quality (EQ), such that EQ will be greater 
at higher levels of competition, regardless of state political support for the ACA. 
Hypothesis 3b: Competition will not impact the relationship between state 
political support for the ACA and conformance quality (CQ). 
 
 
 
 
15 
2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Sample 
We test our hypotheses by leveraging a unique, longitudinal dataset combining 
state government ideology scores, Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) scores, CMS Cost Reports, and US Census data. The 
unit of analysis in our study is the firm, more specifically, a hospital. We collected data 
on short stay acute care and critical access hospitals for the eight year period from 2007 – 
2014. To avoid biasing results with data from specialty hospitals with excessive average 
length of stays and uniquely complex patient conditions, such as long term acute care or 
rehabilitation hospitals, our sample population does not include these types of hospitals. 
These hospitals also have significantly different operations compared to acute care 
hospitals and are often not required to report or incur penalties based on EQ performance. 
The hospitals included in our dataset are derived from all short term acute care hospitals 
registered with Medicare, as reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
Our final dataset contains up to 19,982 hospital–year observations for our dependent 
variables.  
2.2.2 Measures 
The financial and human resources committed by a hospital to comply with ACA 
performance mandates should be reflected in the relative improvement in a hospital’s 
performance over time. Therefore, consistent with prior literature, we measure hospitals’ 
resource commitment and investments in complying with ACA performance mandates, 
which are difficult to capture, in terms of the actual achievement on this performance 
outcome (Hitt et al. 1991).  
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Experiential quality: In this study, we measure experiential quality (EQ) based on scores 
of an industrywide consumer assessment tool, the HCAHPS survey, which captures patient 
beliefs about their interaction with providers during their inpatient hospital stay. The 
measures selected to represent a hospital’s EQ reflect a consensus between healthcare 
reporting agencies CMS and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and include 
six questions related to provider communication and responsiveness to patient needs. 
Specifically, the HCAHPS survey items that are averaged include, (1) How often did 
doctors communicate well with patients? (2) How often did nurses communicate well with 
patients? (3) How often did patients receive help quickly from hospital staff? (4) How often 
did staff explain about medicines before giving them to patients? (5) How often was the 
patient pain controlled? (6) Were patients given information about what to do during their 
recovery at home? Consistent with prior literature, we invoke a logit transformation of a 
hospital’s percentage score (Chandrasekaran et al. 2012, Sharma et al. 2016). Following 
guidelines from CMS, a minimum of 300 completed HCAHPS surveys from each hospital 
for a 12-month period was required to compute a hospital’s EQ, such that EQ for a hospital 
i with a percentage score 𝑄  is calculated by, 
𝐸𝑄 = 𝐿𝑛
𝑄
1 − 𝑄
 
Conformance Quality: Following prior literature, we measure conformance quality (CQ) 
through a logit transformation (Collett 2003, Sharma et al. 2016) of the weighted average 
Pi of the percentage compliance along four dimensions: Heart Attack (AMI), Heart Failure 
(HF), Pneumonia (PN) and Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP). Following 
guidelines from CMS, a sample of at least 25 eligible patients was required to compute a 
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hospital’s CQ, such that CQ for a hospital i with a compliance percentage 𝑃  is calculated 
by, 
𝐶𝑄 = 𝐿𝑛
𝑃
1 − 𝑃
 
Government Ideology: Political support for the ACA is operationalized using a scale 
adapted from political science (Berry et al. 2010), government ideology. The measure is 
reflective of the ideological orientation of five key groups within each state government: 
the governor and both major party delegations in the state’s Senate and House of 
Representatives. The ideological position of each group is estimated using coordinates 
derived from a comprehensive set of roll-call voting records of state legislators elected to 
the United States Congress (Poole 1998). The ideological orientation of each group is 
then weighted by the power each of these actors has over state policy decisions (Berry et 
al. 1998).  Unique to this measure is its ability to capture varying degrees of ideology 
within a given political party (i.e. the ideology of one Republican-dominated state 
legislature is not equal to the ideology of another Republican-dominated state 
legislature). 
Since the policy orientation of each group in state government changes slightly 
from year to year, as does the performance of an organization, our study requires a time 
variant measure of government ideology to accurately assess its longitudinal impact on 
hospital performance. As such, the government ideology measure employed in this study 
reflects changes in the policy orientation of elected officials between election cycles, 
absorbing ideological nuances which would not be revealed through the utilization of a 
static measure that only captures ideological beliefs at the onset of each elected official’s 
term. The state government ideology scores employed in our study have been extensively 
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validated against alternative measures of government ideology in prior literature. For a 
complete description of measure validation, we refer readers to Berry et al. (2010). 
Competition: The competition construct in our study is operationalized using a market-
based classification developed by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare1, which establishes 
that hospitals should be grouped not by traditional population metrics, such as the metro 
statistical area defined by the United States Census, but instead by a collection of zip 
codes whose Medicare residents receive the majority of their hospitalizations from the 
hospitals in that area. This geographic area is defined as the Hospital Service Area (HSA) 
in which a hospital conducts business. Although the numbers of hospitals included in a 
specific HSA have changed over time (due to hospital consolidation and closures), the zip 
code linkages composing each HSA have remained constant, enabling accurate 
comparison of changes within each HSA over time.  
After establishing the service area to which each hospital belongs, we 
operationalize each hospital’s competition within its service area as the average EQ (CQ) 
performance in that HSA. Since our dependent variable of interest is a hospital’s EQ 
(CQ) performance, and because we are interested in the impact of a hospital’s direct 
competitors’ performance on this outcome variable, we exclude each hospital’s own EQ 
(CQ) performance score from our calculation of competition. 
Covariates: Common in this research, we control for several hospital-specific factors 
previously identified to influence hospital performance. Following the belief that larger 
 
1 The data set forth at “Data by Region” of publication was obtained from The Dartmouth 
Atlas, which is funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Dartmouth 
Clinical and Translational Science Institute, under award number UL1TR001086 from 
the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH). 
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hospitals may affect resource utilization (Brown et al. 2003), we control for hospital size 
by including the number of staffed beds as reported by CMS. The complexity of a 
hospital’s patient mix may influence its operational performance; therefore, we 
incorporate each hospital’s case mix index (CMI) to enable unbiased comparisons of 
hospital performance among hospitals treating variable levels of patient complexity. We 
also control for the average patient length of stay in each hospital in our dataset as 
reported by CMS. Medical residents are at the onset of their medical careers and often 
require more resources to facilitate their training and development as clinicians 
(Grosskopf et al. 2001), which may compromise a hospital’s operational performance 
(Sharma et al. 2016). As such, we control for the ratio of medical residents per licensed 
hospital bed. We also include a continuous measure of a hospital’s Medicare payer mix to 
control for the impact that this subset of patients may have on hospital performance.  
To account for differences in hospital performance before and after the 
introduction of the VBP program, which operationalized the performance mandates from 
the ACA, we include a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in the year that VBP took 
effect (2011). Since ideological and cultural beliefs vary by regions within the United 
States, we control for regional differences in our model by including a dummy variable 
for each of the four main region classifications in the United States: South, Northeast, 
Midwest, and West. Lastly, we included a dummy variable for each year in our dataset to 
account for time effects.  
We present summary statistics for the key variables in our analysis in Table 2.1 
below, followed by Pearson correlations (using pairwise deletion) in Table 2.2. These 
statistics provide an initial assessment of our data’s validity, showing a significant 
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correlation between government ideology and EQ performance (r = − 0.146, p<0.05). We 
also see a positive and significant correlation between competition and hospital EQ (r = 
0.892, p<0.05) and CQ (r = 0.882, p<0.05) performance, indicating that increased 
competition leads hospitals to invest more heavily in improving both types of 
performance. Each of the continuous independent variables in our models were centered 
prior to analysis. 
    Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Experiential 
quality (EQ) 
0.938 0.255 − 0.936 3.664 
Conformance 
quality (CQ) 
3.309 1.153 − 1.740 8.874 
Government 
ideology 
46.582 28.671 0.000 92.451 
Competition 
(EQ) 
0.940 0.228 – 0.936 3.664 
Competition 
(CQ) 
3.271 1.017 – 1.740 8.722 
Percent 
Medicare 
0.466 0.144 0.000 0.971 
Case mix 
index (CMI) 
1.429 0.281 0.660 4.810 
Length of 
stay (LOS) 
4.343 0.885 0.643 11.798 
Bed count 235.366 196.164 4.000 1928.000 
Resident to 
bed 
0.062 0.155 0.000 1.996 
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Table 2.2 Pairwise Correlation Table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. EQ ....1.000
2. CQ ...0.1790* ....1.000
3. Government 
Ideology − 0.1459* − 0.0841* ....1.000
4. Competition (EQ) ...0.8916* ...0.1675* − 0.1595* ....1.000
5. Competition (CQ) ...0.1519* ...0.8815* − 0.0841* ...0.1680* ....1.000
6. Medicare pct ...0.1380* − 0.2775* .0.0031 ...0.1537* − 0.2821* ...1.000
7. Case mix index 
(CMI) − 0.0779* ...0.3987* − 0.0262* − 0.1307* ...0.3542* − 0.3545* ..1.000
8. Length of stay 
(LOS) − 0.2831* .0.0059 ...0.0812* − 0.2294* ...0.0162* − 0.1126* 0.2824* ..1.000
9. Bed count − 0.2786* ...0.1583* ...0.0571* − 0.2592* ...0.1469* − 0.3072* 0.5709* 0.4863* ..1.000
10. Resident to bed − 0.1792* ...0.0634* ...0.1378* − 0.1776* ...0.0780* − 0.3454* 0.3544* 0.3435* 0.5025* ..1.000
* p < 0.05
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2.2.3 Model Specification 
We conduct our analysis using ordinary least squares panel regression with 
clustering by hospital. When analyzing panel data in which observations are repeated for 
the same hospital over time, adhering to the traditional linear regression assumption that 
all standard errors are independently and identically distributed may lead to biased 
results. To avoid such bias, we cluster standard errors by hospital to allow for correlation 
of model errors for the same hospital in different time periods.  
Prior to analysis, we examined our proposed set of control variables by employing 
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) method (Tibshirani 1996) 
to avoid introducing unnecessary control variables into our model, which may lead to 
model overfitting. LASSO involves a penalized regression, with each additional control 
variable incurring a penalty based on the data structure. Regressor–specific penalty 
loadings for the heteroskedastic and clustered cases are derived following the methods 
described in Belloni et al. (2012). The LASSO procedure results provide statistical 
validation of the control variables that we selected for inclusion in our model. Although 
the LASSO procedure did not select hospital bed count and resident to bed ratio as 
relevant controls, we continue to include them in our models to maintain consistency with 
prior healthcare operations literature (Sharma et al. 2016, Brown et al. 2003).2  
We test our hypotheses using the regression equation below in which the 
dependent variable 𝑌 ,  represents the EQ (CQ) performance for hospital 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑋 ,  is 
the covariate vector for the variables of interest – government ideology and competition, 
 
2 Empirical results remain consistent with (or without) the inclusion of hospital bed count 
and resident to bed ratio as additional control variables 
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𝑍 ,  is a vector of control variables and 𝜀 ,  is the error term, with standard errors clustered 
by N hospitals in our sample, where N equals up to 3,078 hospitals. 
𝑌 , = 𝑋 , 𝛽 + 𝑍 , 𝛾 + 𝜀 ,  
where 𝐸 𝜀 𝜀 =
𝜎( )  𝑖𝑓 𝑔 = 𝑔
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑔 ≠ 𝑔
; 𝑔 = 1 … N 
The results for the main effects of government ideology on EQ (H1a) and CQ (H1b) 
performance, along with the results for the main effects of competition on EQ (H2a) and 
CQ (H2b) performance are presented in Table 2.3. 
We further test the hypothesized interaction between government ideology and 
competition on EQ (H3a) and CQ (H3b) performance by modifying the regression 
equation to include the addition of an interaction term between these variables and report 
these results in Table 2.4. Following hypothesis testing, we conduct several robustness 
and post hoc tests to validate our findings.  
2.3 RESULTS 
Prior to reporting findings from tests for each of our hypotheses, we tested a 
model with only control variables to establish a baseline of the variance explained by 
control variables alone. These results are reported in Table 2.3 (Models 1 and 3). Table 
2.3 (Models 2 and 4) also reports results for the hypothesized main effects of government 
ideology on EQ (H1a) and CQ (H1b) performance. The results indicate that government 
ideology has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.017) on hospital EQ 
performance, lending support for H1a. This finding means that hospitals operating in 
states that support the ACA (government ideology one standard deviation above the 
mean) are associated with 12.3% higher EQ performance scores, on average, than 
hospitals operating in states which do not support the ACA (government ideology one 
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standard deviation below the mean). In contrast, results from Model 4 indicate that 
government ideology has no significant impact (coefficient = − 0.001; p-value = 0.206) 
on hospital CQ performance, supporting H1b. 
Table 2.3 (Models 2 and 4) shows results for the hypothesized main effects of 
competition on EQ (H2a) and CQ (H2b) performance. The results indicate that 
competition has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.915; p-value = 0.000) on hospital EQ 
performance, supporting H2a. This finding means that hospitals operating in highly 
competitive areas (one standard deviation above the mean) are associated with 44% 
higher EQ performance scores, on average, than hospitals operating in areas with low 
competition (one standard deviation below the mean). Further, results from Model 4 
indicate that competition has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.886; p-value = 0.000) on 
hospital CQ performance, lending support for H2b. This finding means that hospitals 
operating in highly competitive areas (one standard deviation above the mean) are 
associated with 55% higher CQ performance scores, on average, than hospitals operating 
in areas with low competition (one standard deviation below the mean). We also note that 
integrating our variables of interest has substantially increased the variance explained in 
our models, relative to baseline models with only control variables included. 
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Table 2.3 Main Effects of Government Ideology and Competition on Hospital 
Performance 
 DV = Experiential Quality (EQ) DV = Conformance Quality (CQ) 
 Controls 
only 
(1) 
Main  
model 
(2) 
Controls 
only 
(3) 
Main 
model 
(4) 
Government 
ideology 
 0.001** 
(0.000) 
 − 0.001 
(0.000) 
Competition  0.915*** 
(0.010) 
 0.886*** 
(0.008) 
Value Based 
Purchasing 
0.234*** 
(0.007) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
2.228*** 
(0.030) 
0.322*** 
(0.025) 
Percent 
Medicare 
0.063* 
(0.035) 
− 0.018 
(0.019) 
− 0.113 
(0.176) 
0.117 
(0.109) 
Case mix 
index (CMI) 
0.081*** 
(0.019) 
0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.464*** 
(0.103) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
Length of stay 
(LOS) 
– 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
– 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
– 0.065*** 
(0.016) 
– 0.017 
(0.004) 
Bed count 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Resident to 
bed 
0.024 
(0.062) 
0.009 
(0.050) 
0.034 
(0.201) 
0.066 
(0.151) 
Observations 19,982 19,982 19,571 19,571 
R2 0.136 0.797 0.323 0.746 
Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard errors (in parentheses) 
clustered by hospital; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10% 
The interaction results in Table 2.4 (Model 5) provide support for the moderating 
impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.000) of competition on the relationship between 
government ideology and hospital EQ performance, supporting H3a. In contrast, the 
interaction results in Table 2.4 (Model 6) indicate no moderating impact (coefficient = − 
0.001; p-value = 0.886) of competition on the relationship between government ideology 
and hospital CQ performance, lending support for H3b. As shown by the interaction plot 
in Figure 2.1, plotted over the range of one standard deviation above and below the mean, 
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when hospitals are embedded within highly competitive service areas, there is a minimal 
difference (about 1.4%) in the EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low 
government ideology (do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states 
with high government ideology (supported the ACA). When hospitals are embedded in 
service areas with low competition, there is also a minimal difference (about 1.1%) in the 
EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low government ideology (do not support 
the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states with high government ideology 
(supported the ACA). Perhaps more importantly, hospitals operating in service areas with 
high competition are always associated with superior EQ performance, regardless of the 
level of support for the ACA, indicating that competitor responses to the legislation 
dominate the effect of government ideology on hospital EQ.  
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Table 2.4 Interaction of Government Ideology and Competition on 
           Hospital Performance 
 DV = Experiential 
Quality (EQ) 
DV = Conformance 
Quality (CQ) 
 (5) (6) 
Government 
ideology 
0.001 
(0.000) 
− 0.001 
(0.000) 
Competition 0.919*** 
(0.010) 
0.886*** 
(0.008) 
Govt Ideology x 
competition 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
− 0.001 
(0.000) 
Value Based 
Purchasing 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.323*** 
(0.025) 
Percent Medicare − 0.022 
(0.019) 
0.118 
(0.110) 
Case mix index 
(CMI) 
0.036*** 
(0.014) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
Length of stay 
(LOS) 
– 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
– 0.017 
(0.011) 
Bed count 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Resident to bed 0.009 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.151) 
Observations 19,982 19,571 
R2 0.798 0.746 
Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant 
at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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  Figure 2.1 Interaction of Government Ideology and Competition on Experiential Quality 
 
2.3.1 Post Hoc Testing 
The VBP program, which operationalized the performance mandates 
implemented by the ACA, went into effect in July 2011. Since the introduction of this 
program marked the beginning of the penalty period for hospitals, we set out to 
investigate whether the relationship between government ideology and hospital 
performance differed before and after the start of this program. To empirically test this 
hypothesis, we interacted government ideology and the binary VBP variable in our 
regression equation and examined the impact on EQ (CQ) hospital performance. The 
results of the post hoc test for EQ performance are reported in Table 2.5 (Model 7) and 
provide support for the moderating impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.014) of the 
VBP program on the relationship between government ideology and hospital EQ 
performance. In contrast, the interaction results in Table 2.5 (Model 8) indicate no 
moderating impact (coefficient = − 0.001; p-value = 0.683) of the VBP program on the 
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relationship between government ideology and hospital CQ performance. As shown by 
the interaction plot in Figure 2.2, plotted over the range of one standard deviation above 
and below the mean, prior to the start of the VBP program, there is no significant 
difference in the EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low government ideology 
(do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states with high government 
ideology (supported the ACA). However, after the start of the VBP program, hospitals 
operating in states with high government ideology (supported the ACA) have higher EQ 
scores than their peers operating in states with low government ideology (do not support 
the ACA). This finding lends support to our main findings in that hospitals operating in 
areas that support the ACA are more likely to invest in complying with the legislation’s 
EQ performance mandates. The insignificant interaction term for the impact of the VBP 
program on the relationship between government ideology and CQ performance further 
validates our main findings in that hospitals appear to be investing equally in improving 
CQ performance before and after the start of the VBP program, regardless of the level of 
support for the ACA in their operating area. 
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Table 2.5 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based  
                Purchasing on Hospital Performance 
 DV = Experiential 
Quality (EQ) 
DV = Conformance 
Quality (CQ) 
 (7) (8) 
Government 
ideology 
0.001 
(0.000) 
− 0.001 
(0.000) 
Competition 0.916*** 
(0.010) 
0.886*** 
(0.008) 
Value Based 
Purchasing 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.323*** 
(0.025) 
Govt Ideology x 
VBP 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
− 0.001 
(0.000) 
Percent Medicare − 0.022 
(0.019) 
0.120 
(0.111) 
Case mix index 
(CMI) 
0.035*** 
(0.014) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
Length of stay 
(LOS) 
– 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
– 0.017 
(0.011) 
Bed count 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Resident to bed 0.008 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.151) 
Observations 19,982 19,571 
R2 0.797 0.746 
Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant at 
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
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Figure 2.2 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based Purchasing on   
Experiential Quality 
To further investigate how hospital EQ performance was changing after the start 
of the VBP program, we conduct a post hoc test in which we re-operationalize our 
dependent variable as the rate of change in EQ as compared to each hospital’s baseline 
EQ (from 2007). In doing so, we are testing whether hospital EQ performance was 
changing at a greater rate after (as opposed to before) the start of the VBP program. The 
results of this post hoc test are reported in Table 2.6 (Model 9) and provide support for 
the moderating impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.014) of the VBP program on the 
relationship between government ideology and hospital EQ performance rate change. As 
shown by the interaction plot in Figure 2.3, plotted over the range of one standard 
deviation above and below the mean, prior to the start of the VBP program, there is a 
small difference in the EQ rate change of hospitals operating in states with low 
government ideology (do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states 
with high government ideology (supported the ACA). That is, hospitals operating in 
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states that support the ACA have 4.3% higher EQ rate growth than their peers operating 
in states that do not support the ACA. However, after the start of the VBP program, 
hospitals operating in states that supported the ACA have even higher EQ rate growth 
(about 9.5%) than their peers operating in states that do not support the ACA. This 
finding lends support to our prior post hoc finding that hospitals operating in areas that 
support the ACA are more likely to invest in complying with the legislation’s EQ 
performance mandates, and appear to do so at a faster rate than their peers operating in 
areas that do not support the ACA. 
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Table 2.6 Experiential Quality (EQ) Rate 
                Change 
               DV = Experiential Quality        
(EQ) Rate Change 
 (9) 
Government 
ideology 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Competition 0.906*** 
(0.013) 
Value Based 
Purchasing 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
Govt Ideology x 
VBP 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Percent Medicare 0.001 
(0.000) 
Case mix index 
(CMI) 
0.030* 
(0.018) 
Length of stay 
(LOS) 
– 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Bed count 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Resident to bed 0.027 
 (0.075) 
Observations 13,282 
R2 0.041 
Model includes year and region fixed 
effects; robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) clustered by hospital;  
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; 
* significant at 10% 
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Figure 2.3 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based Purchasing on  
         Experiential Quality Rate of Change 
Although elected state level legislators are the policymakers most involved with 
drafting and voting on ACA legislation, we believe it prudent to investigate the potential 
impact of political ideology at more granular levels. In other words, do political beliefs at 
the county level in which hospitals operate induce a similar influence on hospital 
operating performance. To empirically test this assumption, we replace the state-level 
government ideology measure from our main analysis with a binary indicator of political 
affiliation in the county in which a hospital resides. Since county level ideology is time 
invariant, we run this post-hoc test as a panel regression with random effects. The results 
in Table 2.7 (Model 10) provide no support (coefficient = 0.004; p-value = 0.298) for the 
impact of local political ideology on hospital EQ performance. Further, the results 
reported in Table 2.7 (Model 11) provide no support (coefficient = − 0.009; p-value = 
0.602) for the impact of local ideology on CQ performance, validating our finding from 
the test for H1b. Taken together, these findings indicate that hospitals are investing in 
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ACA compliance related to EQ based on the political support for the legislation at the 
state level, as opposed to the local level. 
      Table 2.7 Impact of Local Ideology on Hospital Performance 
 
                DV = Experiential 
Quality (EQ) 
DV = Conformance 
Quality (CQ) 
 (10) (11) 
Local ideology 0.004 
(0.004) 
− 0.009 
(0.017) 
Competition 0.931*** 
(0.009) 
0.889*** 
(0.008) 
Value Based 
Purchasing 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.270*** 
(0.022) 
Percent Medicare − 0.012 
(0.014) 
− 0.080 
 (0.066) 
Case mix index 
(CMI) 
0.065*** 
(0.010) 
0.402*** 
(0.045) 
Length of stay 
(LOS) 
– 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
– 0.025*** 
(0.009) 
Bed count 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Resident to bed – 0.027 
 (0.020) 
– 0.265*** 
 (0.060) 
Observations 19,170 18,797 
R2 0.809 0.746 
Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard 
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant at 
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
2.3.2 Robustness Checks 
The formula invoked for our operationalization of government ideology relies on 
an estimate of the ideological position of each of the five key groups in state legislature, 
which is itself derived from a comprehensive set of roll-call voting records of state 
legislators elected to the United States Congress (Poole 1998). To further validate the use 
of this operationalization, we replace our measure of government ideology with an 
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alternative measure which substitutes roll-call voting records with interest-group ratings 
calculated by the Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO Committee on 
Political Education (Berry et al. 1998). The results presented for the hypothesized main 
effects in Table 2.3 and interaction terms in Table 2.4 remain robust to this alternative 
operationalization, validating our initial findings. 
We also examine the impact of competition on hospital performance through an 
alternative operationalization which replaces the average EQ (CQ) performance of 
competitors in a hospital’s service area (HSA) with the average EQ (CQ) performance of 
competitors in a larger geographic area, the hospital’s referral region (HRR). The main 
effects of this alternative competition measure remain robust to those findings reported in 
Table 2.3 (Models 2 and 4). 
2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Legislative directives often require organizations to invest a substantial amount of 
financial and human resources to comply with their mandates. Despite the prevalence of 
such directives, and the degree to which they can reshape entire industries, little research 
focuses on the factors within firms’ operating environments which influence their 
compliance with legislative mandates. Leveraging real options theory and empirical data 
from the US hospital industry, we examine how political support for the ACA legislation 
in the area in which a hospital operates impacts its compliance with legislative mandates.  
We find that, when a hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will 
remain in place, it decreases the value for hospitals to limit their investments to comply 
with its operational performance directives. In contrast, when a hospital’s political 
environment suggests the ACA will be repealed, hospitals are more likely to limit their 
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investments to comply, with the expectation that the legislation will be amended or 
repealed. This result is particularly true for newer performance metrics, namely 
experiential quality, which require a significant investment of human and financial 
resources. Our findings also indicate that competitor actions incentivize firms to comply 
with legislative directives, for both new and traditional performance metrics.  
Through examining these relationships, we contribute to the literature by 
enhancing our understanding of the impact of firms’ operating environments on 
compliance with industry legislation. More specifically, we illustrate that government 
ideology in the area where a firm operates alters how the organization values the costs of 
noncompliance, such that when the political environment suggests a certain future of 
repeal or substantial amendment, firms find greater value in not complying with the 
directives of the legislation. Instead, firms limit their investments in compliance for fear 
of allocating finite resources to those areas of their business which may not be mandated 
by legislation in the future. 
In addition, we extend the literature on real options surrounding exogenous 
shocks by identifying the concept of legislative uncertainty in influencing how 
organizations responds to legislative directives. In doing so, we provide support for the 
notion that firms look to their political environment for signals about how to respond to 
macro-policy decisions. Finally, our study setting illustrates that options can contribute 
value not only through generating future cash inflows, but also through avoiding cash 
outflows to respond to compliance changes which may be altered in the future. Such 
perceptions may lead firms to carefully consider investments to comply with tenuous 
legislative directives, particularly when resources are finite, scarce and unable to be 
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recouped in the future. Firms may instead prefer to invest their finite resources in areas of 
their business with a historically demonstrated and more stable return on investment, 
while concurrently hoping for an amendment or repeal of the legislation. Doing so may 
lead firms to realize a future competitive advantage if the legislation is repealed and other 
competitors have exhausted resources toward complying with mandates which no longer 
exist. 
2.4.1 Practice and Policy Implications 
First, our results indicate that support for legislation in a firm’s political 
environment has varying degrees of impact, dependent upon the type of performance. 
Specifically, in the case of the ACA we find that government ideology had a significant 
impact on EQ, a recently introduced performance metric, as compared to CQ, a more 
traditional performance metric. This finding has implications on the design and rollout of 
legislative policy. Given the increasing non-bipartisan nature of legislative actions, 
compliance for legislative directives can be increased by building consensus amongst 
industry stakeholders before rollout.  
Second, our findings introduce questions about the impact that non-bipartisan 
legislation may have on firms’ decisions and the relative degree of compliance with 
legislative directives. Such concerns regarding the likelihood of firms to comply not only 
apply in the short term, but also span across political administrations if governing power 
shifts after the next popular election. Such swings in regulatory policy may lead to poor 
economic investment decisions by firms, dampening economic growth and quality 
improvement across entire industries. Finally, our findings have practical implications for 
health system managers such that limiting investment in government policies which are 
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liable to change (or may not exist) in the future may free up nonrecoverable resources to 
be invested in other areas of firm operations. 
2.4.2 Limitations and Conclusion 
Our study has some limitations that should be considered in future research. 
While we have taken steps to follow guidance from prior literature, the EQ measure 
employed in our study is one of many ways to operationalize patient experience. 
Although not the aim of this study, future research should examine multiple aspects of 
experiential quality to validate consistency across measures. Additionally, the 
government ideology construct available to us was measured at the state level. Although 
broad scale legislative policy, such as the ACA, is most often created and implemented 
by state and national legislators, future work may explore the nuances of more granular 
levels of ideology, such as Congressional districts or census tract data, to determine if the 
relationships between the constructs in our study hold at more concentrated levels of 
geography. Finally, we are unable to directly measure the level of resources that hospitals 
allocated toward improving both EQ and CQ in response to the ACA, and instead must 
utilize the actual performance on these domains as a proxy for hospital investments. 
Although performance has been used as a proxy for difficult to measure constructs in 
other streams of literature (for example, Hitt et al. 1991), future work might explore 
alternative operationalizations of the resource investment construct through survey data 
or analysis of firm accounting statements. 
In conclusion, our study provides empirical evidence of the impact of firms’ 
political environments on firm organizational performance following the introduction of 
an exogenous legislative shock. Through an examination of the political and competitive 
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environment within which a firm operates, we contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of how firms comply with legislative directives. Specifically, we leverage 
real options theory and data from the U.S. hospital industry to illustrate that hospitals 
differ in the degree to which they comply with ACA mandates based on the degree of 
political support for the legislation in the area in which they operate.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH POLICY: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF OPIOID PRESCRIBING BEHAVIOR
“As a result of the consequences of the opioid crisis affecting our Nation, on this 
date and after consultation with public health officials as necessary, I, Eric. D. Hargan, 
Acting Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the authority vested in me 
under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby determine that a public 
health emergency exists nationwide.'' 
With this signed statement on October 26, 2017, the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services officially declared the country's opioid epidemic to be a 
national health emergency. This policy declaration follows statistics which indicate that 
opioids were responsible for greater than 42,000 overdose deaths in the United States in 
2016 (Scholl et al. 2019), while the latest projections from the United States Council of 
Economic Advisers (2017) estimated the economic impact of the opioid epidemic in 2015 
to be over $500 billion, equivalent to approximately 2.8% of U.S. GDP. Statistics such as 
these quantify the negative health and economic outcomes of the opioid crisis, leading 
researchers to investigate possible factors contributing to the societal consequences of the 
opioid epidemic. 
Underlying the overall death rate attributed to the general group of controlled 
substances classified as opioids, recent research shows that over 40% of all opioid-related 
deaths are attributable to prescription opioids, equating to upwards of 46 deaths per day 
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(Scholl et al. 2019). Evidence also indicates that for each daily death attributable to an 
opioid overdose, 30 non-fatal overdoses also occur (Frazier et al. 2017). Supporting these 
statistical claims linking opioid overdose deaths to prescription opioids, researchers at the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have indicated that the increase in 
opioid prescribing is among the principal factors contributing to the growing epidemic of 
opioid addiction and abuse in the U.S. (Rudd et al. 2016). Opioid dependence often 
begins when patients become addicted to opioids following receipt of a legal opioid 
prescription from a licensed prescriber for a legitimate medical reason. Recent evidence 
indicates that while supply-side interventions over the last decade have reduced the rate 
at which legal prescriptions lead to opioid addiction, prescribed drugs, such as oxycodone 
and hydrocodone, still constitute greater than 60% of opioid initiators (Cicero, Ellis and 
Kasper 2017). That is, opioid prescriptions continue to serve as the principal gateway to 
the growing epidemic of opioid addiction and abuse in the U.S. Recognizing the role of 
opioid prescription rates in this crisis, and following direction from the President in April 
2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services included reducing opioid 
prescribing for pain management as one of the five priorities of its Opioid Strategy (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2018). 
Prior research has examined the prevalence of controlled substance abuse and, in 
particular, the role that prescribers play in this epidemic. Much of this research has 
focused on the field of pain management and post-surgical care. As one example, a 2011 
study of patients who received prescription narcotics for pain management following 
urologic surgery concluded that 67% of patients had a surplus of medication in their 
initial prescriptions (Bates et al. 2011). More recent studies have alluded to the role 
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played by medical groups and policymakers in enabling, perhaps even encouraging, an 
increase in opioid prescribing to manage patient pain. Clarke, Skoufalos, and Scranton 
(2016), for example, identify the following events, which are widely believed to have 
contributed to an increase in opioid prescribing. Beginning in 1995, the American Pain 
Society advocated for clinicians to assess patient pain at every clinical assessment, 
regardless of a patient's chief complaint; a campaign titled ``Pain: The Fifth Vital Sign'' 
(Campbell 1996). After further assessment and following recommendations from the 
American Pain Society, in 1999, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations officially established pain as ``The Fifth Vital Sign'', elevating the 
importance of patient pain assessment and management on par with the traditional vital 
signs of heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure and body temperature (Walid et al. 
2008). Finally, further establishing the importance of pain management among the 
primary responsibilities of clinicians to their patients, in 2000, the largest integrated 
health system in the United States, the Veterans Health Administration, also added pain 
as ``The Fifth Vital Sign'' (Department of Veterans Affairs 2000). Despite the consensus 
that pain is a critical health factor, unlike the four other vital signs, pain assessment is 
predicated upon a complex and subjective process which requires substantial investment 
of time and effort for diagnosis (Carr and Jacox 1997). Thus, including pain as a default 
on a physician's patient checklist could significantly increase the time a physician needs 
to spend with each patient. 
Given that prior research has demonstrated a link between physicians, as 
prescribers, and the opioid epidemic, we set out to investigate how a key operational 
factor, namely prescribers’ workload, influences opioid prescribing behavior. In the 
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operations management literature, workload has been shown to influence worker 
behavior, leading to changes in service quality and speed (Tan and Nettesine 2014). More 
specifically, in the healthcare operations literature, increasing physician workload is 
shown to result in temporary improvements to patient throughput, yet prolonged periods 
of high workload often lead to reductions in operational efficiency and adverse patient 
health outcomes (Kc and Terwiesch 2009, 2012). Further, Powell et al. (2012) 
demonstrate evidence that higher workloads not only compromise the speed and quality 
at which physicians care for patients but may also have a detrimental impact on tasks 
which require attention to detail. Building on this body of work and extending the 
investigation of workload into an area of study with severe societal consequences, we set 
out to examine how physician workload impacts opioid prescribing behavior. 
The U.S. healthcare system has been plagued with capacity shortfalls (Kirch and 
Petelle 2017), and new policies implemented under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) have only exacerbated the supply imbalance. Access expansion, along 
with rising clerical burdens and the introduction of stringent regulatory requirements 
have increased the workload on physicians (Shanafelt et al. 2017), who were already 
facing high burnout rates (Shanafelt et al. 2015). Higher physician utilization has been 
linked to an increase in the cognitive load on physicians (Laxmisan et al. 2007). Prior 
work in the field of psychology has shown evidence that increases to an individual’s 
cognitive burden are attributed to time pressures which may induce individuals to alter 
their typical work routines (Miller 1960, Zur and Breznitz 1981), through avoidance or 
filtration of certain tasks. With higher workloads, physicians have less time to gather and 
incorporate additional patient information into their clinical decision making. Tasks 
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particularly susceptible to avoidance and filtration are those viewed by the decision 
maker as subjective in nature. Patient pain assessment, because of the complex and 
subjective nature of the task, is an onerous process necessitating a “social transaction 
between caregiver and patient” (Carr and Jacox 1997). The subjective nature of the task 
may motivate physicians with higher workloads to engage in avoidance or filtering, 
rather than spending the time to complete a thorough assessment of patient pain. In fact, 
prior studies have found some evidence of prescription rate increases for physicians with 
a greater number of daily patient interactions (Davidson et al. 1994) and physicians with 
shorter length patient visits (Tamblyn et al. 1997). These studies, however, focused on a 
narrow range of patient populations with similar characteristics and did not examine 
those drugs classified as opioids. In an effort to fill this gap in the literature, we explore 
how physician workload impacts the prescribing rate of opioids across a medically and 
geographically diverse population of prescribers and patients.  
To examine the impact of prescriber workload on opioid prescribing rates, we 
analyze 43 months of prescription data in the hospital setting from a state-governed 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP). PDMPs are electronic databases, 
managed by each state, to track the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances to 
patients (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017). Figure 3.1, which shows 
opioid prescribing trends from our sample of hospital-based prescribers, indicates that 
prescriber workload has a substantial impact on opioid prescribing behavior, such that 
prescribers operating at high levels of workload (75th percentile) prescribe a significantly 
higher level of opioids, on average, per prescription, than their peers with low levels of 
workload (25th percentile). 
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Figure 3.1 Opioid Prescription Rates by Prescriber Workload 
Upon more detailed examination of the opioid prescribing trends resulting from 
differential levels of prescriber workload, we noticed a decreasing trend in opioid 
prescription rates (beginning with the start of our study period) which appears to level off 
during the middle of 2011. In fact, the decreasing trend appears to not only terminate, but 
even turn slightly positive around this time. This inflection point becomes even more 
evident when plotting the mean opioid prescription rate over time, reflected in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Mean Opioid Prescription Rate by Month 
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Having observed this trend change in opioid prescriptions rates in the middle of 
2011, we turn our attention to macro-level environmental factors that may be associated 
with such a shift. Following careful consideration and empirical testing of related macro-
level policy changes which may impact hospital operations3, the event associated with 
changes to hospital-based opioid prescribing was a policy change that took effect in July 
2011, the implementation of the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP 
program was among the foundational components of the ACA, passed by Congress and 
signed into law by the President on March 23, 2010, with the goal of shifting healthcare 
services from a fee-for-service structure to a pay-for-performance model (Werner et al. 
2011). The VBP program operationalized this pay-for-performance environment in the 
hospital setting by introducing publicly reported performance metrics focused on the 
short-term health outcomes of patients, including a survey to assess how patients viewed 
their hospital experience. Among the patient experience metrics are specific components 
related to patients' assessment of how well their pain was managed by hospital providers. 
The VBP program directly linked reimbursement payments of hospitals and physicians to 
their performance on these metrics.4 
Prior literature has demonstrated that individual behavior can be altered through 
incentive alignment and monitoring (Tosi, Katz and Gomez-Mejia 1997), and this 
 
3 The authors conducted numerous empirical tests examining the potential impact of 
alternative environmental and policy changes on hospital-based opioid prescribing. These 
results, which indicate no significant impact of alternative events on opioid prescribing, 
are reported in the Empirical Supplement. 
4 Surveys of health systems and physician groups indicate that physician pay is 
increasingly tied to organization level patient satisfaction and other value-based metrics 
(American Medical Group Association 2017, SullivanCotter 2018), leading to alignment 
between the reimbursement of hospitals and physicians in their employ. 
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phenomenon has been validated in clinical settings (Staats et al. 2017, Song et al. 2019). 
Jointly, these mechanisms of monitoring (e.g. public reporting) and incentive alignment 
create pressure on hospitals and physicians to satisfy the short-term quality outcomes 
(e.g. patients' subjective assessment of their care experience and pain management) 
incentivized by VBP. Such pressure may induce higher levels of opioid prescribing by 
physicians (to improve the likelihood that patients perceive a more positive experience 
and better pain management), since denial of patient requests for pain medicine is 
associated with lower patient satisfaction (Jerant et al. 2018). In fact, responding to 
physician concerns, and despite a lack of empirical evidence with respect to the 
association between VBP incentives and opioid prescribing, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) has proposed future elimination of pain management questions 
on patient surveys (Minemyer 2018). Our empirical findings indicate a positive and 
statistically significant increase in opioid prescription rates immediately following the 
onset of the initial VBP performance period in July 2011, followed by a significant 
positive trend in opioid prescription rates in subsequent time periods, indicating that the 
introduction of policy incentives focused on short-term quality outcomes are associated 
with an increase in hospital-based opioid prescription rates. 
If the shift in opioid prescribing trends is truly attributable to VBP, we would 
anticipate that this effect is stronger in areas with more competition. Competition is 
widely believed to encourage businesses to either differentiate themselves from other 
competitors (Ocasio 1997) or engage in imitation (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993) to 
reduce the degree of differentiation that a competitor currently possesses. It is also known 
that medical outcomes that are easily observed and understood by patients are likely to 
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have a higher impact on patient choice of medical provider. For example, Goldman and 
Romley (2008) find that in highly competitive markets, patients are more likely to 
favorably respond to improvements in observable metrics than improvements in difficult 
to observe clinical metrics. Along similar lines, we argue that patients can easily discern 
whether (or not) they received a prescription to manage their pain as well as the relative 
volume (e.g. quantity of pills, days' supply) of the prescription received. If patients are 
unhappy with the perceived manner in which a provider managed their pain, they may 
not only be dissatisfied with the current care episode but may also migrate to other 
providers who they perceive as being more responsive to their needs. In areas of high 
competition, such migration is easier and may result in negative economic ramifications 
for providers with departing patients, exerting added pressure on hospitals and physicians 
to satisfy patient expectations for pain management. Thus, one indicator that should lend 
support to our hypothesis that the implementation of VBP led to an increase in the rate of 
opioid prescriptions is if the effect was stronger under conditions of higher competition, 
since patient satisfaction results are publicly reported and may have a larger influence on 
customer defections in areas where more choices are available.5 We find that opioid 
prescribing is amplified in areas of intense competition, such that in the pre-VBP period 
areas of high competition experienced a slower decrease in opioid prescription rates, 
while experiencing higher increases in opioid prescription rates following the 
introduction of VBP. 
 
5 Since public reporting of patient satisfaction scores is limited to hospitals, the study 
sample is restricted to hospital-based physicians. 
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Our findings contribute to literature and practice in several ways. Although prior 
work has focused on the investigation of opioid specific policies on opioid prescribing 
rates, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the impact of physician 
workload or macro health policy changes on opioid prescription rates. Further, the current 
body of literature provides only a partial understanding of the factors associated with 
opioid prescribing while also lacking prescriptive operational insights which can 
contribute to its reduction. Our study fills this gap by focusing on the role of recent 
legislation aimed at improving the quality of healthcare services provided, while also 
considering the operational and competitive environment where care is administered. In 
doing so, we expand our understanding of the factors associated with opioid prescription 
practices and offer insights on reducing opioid prescription rates, leading to actionable 
solutions which can reduce the societal impact of the opioid epidemic underway in the 
U.S. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
 To study the impact of prescriber workload, the introduction of the VBP program, 
and market competition on opioid prescribing rates, we compiled a data set of 43 months 
of prescription data from a state-governed PDMP. The state selected for analysis in this 
study is among the most populous in the United States and displays an opioid prescription 
rate trend that is similar to other highly populous states.6 Since our study is focused only 
on the impact of opioid prescribing practices, we limit the data set to only those 
 
6 Student t-tests between the opioid prescribing rate trend in our state versus the 
remaining ten most populous states found no statistically significant difference for eight 
of nine states. The ninth state is Florida, which has a significantly different age 
demographic than the other eight states. 
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controlled substance prescriptions that were written for substances classified as opioids 
by the CDC, encompassing 13,269 distinct National Drug Code numbers (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2016).  Further, because patient satisfaction surveys 
(which inform the reimbursement incentives and penalties under the VBP program) are 
only completed by patients following a qualified, overnight inpatient hospital stay 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), we further restrict our empirical analysis 
of opioid prescribing to only those prescriptions which were written by physicians that 
provide care to patients in inpatient hospital settings (for example, hospitalists, critical 
care medicine, surgeons7, etc.). Following data inclusion restrictions for opioid 
prescriptions written by hospital-based prescribers, the final data set consisted of more 
than 68,000 unique prescriber-month observations across our study period. 
We begin our analysis by examining the underlying policy change (VBP), which 
we believe is associated with the trend change seen in the middle of 2011 (Figure 3.2). To 
do so, we divide our 43 month study period into two parts, in accordance with the 
timeline shown in Figure 3.3. The pre-VBP period encompasses opioid prescriptions 
written during the 18-month period from January 2010 through June 2011, the month 
prior to the start of the initial VBP performance period. The initial VBP performance 
period began in July 2011(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2017), in which 
hospital performance at the start of this month was incorporated into hospitals' 
reimbursement calculations. We delineate July 2013 as the final month for inclusion in 
our analysis to avoid biasing our results with potential confounding effects from a second 
 
7 To rule out any possibility that outpatient surgeries may be confounding our results, we 
also ran our models by further restricting the data set to exclude surgeons. Empirical 
findings remain consistent and are reported in Table 3.6 of the Empirical Supplement. 
 
52 
policy change, Open Payments Reporting, which went into effect in August 2013 and 
may also impact opioid prescribing rates. As such, we established the 25-month period 
from July 2011 - July 2013 as the VBP performance period, where we analyze the impact 
of VBP program implementation on opioid prescription rates, as compared to prescription 
rates from the pre-VBP period.   
 
        Figure 3.3 Study Timeline 
Since our research questions are related to how the VBP program, prescriber 
workload, and the competitive environment are associated with changes in opioid 
prescribing behavior, we are concerned with the average opioid prescription rates by 
month across the prescribers in our data set. Complicating our ability to systematically 
examine average opioid prescription rates across time are two issues: the unobservable 
differences in prescribers (such as their medical training or clinical beliefs about the role 
of opioids in managing patient pain) and the observable differences across the 13,269 
unique drugs classified as opioids by the CDC (such as the relative strength of each drug 
versus other opioids). 
To account for the differences in individual prescribers, which are observed in 
repeated observations over time within our data set (i.e. opioid prescriptions nested 
within prescribers over time), we employ a fixed effects longitudinal model with 
maximum likelihood estimation. The fixed effect longitudinal model (Hausman 1978, 
Mundlak 1978) has many similarities to the piecewise hierarchical linear model 
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(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) and the discontinuous growth model (Bliese and Lang 
2016, Lang and Bliese 2009) in that it enables the researcher to test for the impact of an 
event when data is available across a collection of individuals, both before and after an 
event, and the outcome variable is thought to change at different rates before and after the 
event in question. This modeling approach also has the benefit of controlling, through 
prescriber fixed effects, for endogeneity due to pooling (i.e. multiple observations on 
prescribers over time), and endogeneity due to time, through the introduction of multiple 
time covariates to capture the change before, at, and after the event, which occurs 
independent of the higher level entity (i.e. prescribers). Leveraging this empirical 
strategy, we introduce three time related covariates as independent variables of interest in 
our model: Time, which represents the pre-VBP slope trend; Transition, which reflects 
the transition point at which the VBP program took effect; and Recovery, which captures 
the post-VBP slope trend. 
To account for the relative differences across the 13,269 drugs classified as 
opioids, we employ a technique recommended by the CDC to convert prescriptions to 
their respective morphine milligram equivalents (MME) (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2016). The conversion to an MME value incorporates the quantity of pills 
prescribed (including refills), the strength of each pill, and an MME conversion factor 
determined by the CDC. Operationalizing our outcome variable in this manner enables us 
to capture the various ways in which a prescriber may increase the level of opioids 
prescribed to a patient -- volume, strength, drug choice, drug form -- and accurately 
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accounts for each on a common scale.8 Finally, we normalize our outcome variable by 
dividing the total MME value prescribed (by a given prescriber in a given month) by the 
number of opioid prescriptions written by the prescriber per month to arrive at the 
average MME per prescription for each prescriber in each month of our data set. 
To examine the moderating impact of prescriber workload and competition 
present in the prescriber's geographic area, we introduce the following time variant 
measures into our fixed effects longitudinal analysis. Workload is a normalized 
continuous measure which captures the number of all controlled substance prescriptions 
(not just opioids) written by a prescriber divided by the total days available in a given 
month. This variable measures the relative patient demand and cognitive burden placed 
on each prescriber in each month of the study period. Competition is a normalized 
continuous variable which captures the relative level of access that patients have to 
prescribers and is operationalized as the number of primary care and specialty physicians 
per 100,000 census population in the service area.9 
Finally, we include several additional variables in our analysis to control for 
market and prescriber-level characteristics. We include the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries per 100,000 census population in the geographic service area to account for 
the potential that older populations may receive more prescriptions than younger 
 
8 The operationalization of our dependent variable builds on volume-based measures 
utilized in prior literature (Levy, Paulozzi, Mack and Jones 2015, North, Crane, Ebbert, 
and Tulledge-Scheitel 2018) while also incorporating research conducted by the CDC 
that links small increases in MME values to heightened risks of opioid addiction and 
overdose. 
9 Value Based Purchasing legislation and competition are exogenous variables that occur 
independent of the prescriber. Prescriber workload is susceptible to endogeneity so we 
report results from an instrumental variable regression in Table 3.10 of the Empirical 
Supplement, substantiating the validity of our main findings. 
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populations. Further, because public interest in opioid addiction in the United States was 
beginning to build during our study period, we included an interest trend in our model 
which captures the relative public interest in opioids, operationalized as the Google 
analytics trend for opioids in each month within our study period. Lastly, because the 
type of patients treated by prescribers may influence the rate at which opioids are 
prescribed, we control for all available patient-level characteristics in each prescribers' 
patient population, including the average age of patients, the percentage of males and 
females, and the percentage of various types of patient insurance treated by each 
prescriber in each month. 
3.2 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results of our analysis indicate that, although opioid prescription rates 
exhibited a consistent decline in the 18-month period leading up to the onset of the initial 
VBP performance period, they exhibited a significant increase immediately following the 
introduction of VBP legislation. This result is displayed by the plot of points from our 
fixed effects longitudinal model in Figure 3.4, which normalizes the unexplainable 
randomness of the actual values. More specifically, the average opioid prescription was 
declining by approximately 9.5 MME’s per month from January 2010 through June 2011, 
prior to the onset of the initial VBP performance period.10 That is, patients were receiving 
less prescription opioids, on average, in each month during this 18-month pre-VBP 
period. In the first month of the VBP performance period (July 2011), opioid 
prescriptions immediately increased by approximately 39.5 MME’s per prescription, 
 
10 Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (2) in 
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement. 
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negating more than four months of MME reductions seen in the pre-VBP period. 
Throughout the remainder of the 25-month post-VBP implementation period, the average 
opioid prescription grew slightly, by approximately 0.1 MME’s per month. In other 
words, not only did opioid prescription rates experience a one-time increase immediately 
following the start of the VBP performance period, but VBP is associated with reversing 
the negative trend in opioid prescription rates experienced prior to the onset of VBP.11 
 
Figure 3.4 Impact of Value Based Purchasing Legislation on Opioid Prescription Rates 
This finding supports our belief that VBP, with its focus on enhancing patients’ 
experiential quality of care, is associated with an increase in opioid prescription rates, a 
phenomenon with long-term consequences to patient and societal health, which is at odds 
with the fundamental aim of the ACA. The implication of this finding is that, while well 
 
11 Fit statistics (i.e. R2, Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC) reported in Table 3.4 of the 
Empirical Supplement indicate that the introduction of our time covariates, prescriber 
workload and competition improve model fit over a base model with controls only. 
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intentioned, the financial incentives of VBP created an agency problem which 
encouraged prescribers to prioritize short-term outcomes, potentially at the expense of 
long-term patient health. To remedy this hazard, future policy should incorporate a more 
balanced approach in which providers are incentivized to achieve a more equitable 
allocation of short and long-term health goals. 
To explore the impact of prescriber workload (Figure 3.1), we modify the 
longitudinal fixed effects model to incorporate the moderating impact of prescriber 
workload. Results indicate that prescribers with higher workloads are, on average, 
associated with higher opioid prescription rates across our entire study period, as 
displayed in Figure 3.5. Specifically, during the pre-VBP period, prescribers with higher 
workloads (75th percentile) are prescribing opioids that are approximately 20 MME’s per 
prescription higher, on average, than their lower workload (25th percentile) peers.12  
Consistent with the finding in the main model (Figure 3.4), we find that opioid 
prescriptions, on average, increased approximately 40 MME’s per prescription in the 
month immediately following introduction of the VBP program (July 2011), regardless of 
prescriber workload level. Finally, in the post-VBP period, prescribers with higher 
workloads (75th percentile) are prescribing opioids that are approximately 16 MME’s per 
prescription higher, on average, than their lower workload (25th percentile) peers. 
 
12 Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (3) in 
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement. 
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Figure 3.5 Impact of Prescriber Workload on Opioid Prescription Rates 
This result supports our belief that increased workloads are associated with time 
pressures which compromise clinical information processing and increase reliance on 
prior heuristics, leading to cognitive shortcuts and altered work routines which do not 
incorporate all available clinical information into the pain management clinical decision 
making process. The implication of this finding is that future health policy should 
consider prescriber operational routines during large scale policy implementation. Going 
forward, policymakers may consider prolonged program launch periods which enable 
healthcare providers more time to adequately alter their work routines to adjust to new 
performance expectations. Alternatively, new performance metrics could be 
simultaneously introduced with the dissemination of “best practice” information so that 
physicians are not forced to develop their own work routines to balance new expectations 
with existing high workloads. Further, hospital managers can take steps to mitigate the 
 
59 
impact of high workloads through flexible staffing and increased supplementary staff 
support, such as medical technicians, medical assistants and contract staff. 
Lastly, our findings show that prescribers practicing in geographic areas with high 
levels of competition begin the study period with lower opioid prescription rates, on 
average, but over time experience higher opioid prescription rates than their peers 
practicing in less competitive areas, as shown in Figure 3.6. Specifically, during the pre-
VBP period, prescribers practicing in areas with higher competition (75th percentile) are 
prescribing opioid prescriptions that are initially 20 MME’s per prescription lower, on 
average, than their peers practicing in areas with lower competition (25th percentile), yet 
they surpass the opioid prescription rates of their peers in less competitive areas as the 
VBP performance implementation period nears.13 Further supporting our finding from the 
main model (Figure 3.4), opioid prescriptions, on average, immediately increased by 
approximately 40 MME’s per prescription in the first month of the VBP performance 
period (July 2011), regardless of the level of competition in the area where prescribers 
practice. Lastly, in the post-VBP period, prescribers practicing in more competitive areas 
(75th percentile) prescribed opioids that are approximately 3 MME’s per prescription 
higher, on average, than their peers practicing in less competitive areas (25th percentile), 
with this rate differential gradually increasing over time. 
 
13 Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (4) in 
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement. 
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Figure 3.6 Impact of Competition on Opioid Prescription Rates 
This finding supports our assertion that, following VBP, higher levels of 
competition may lead to increased pressure on prescribers to satisfy patient expectations, 
potentially to avoid migration of patients to alternative care providers which may be 
perceived as more willing to yield to patient expectations. Interestingly, prescribers in 
highly competitive areas appear to begin adjusting for the impact of VBP prior to the 
actual transition, as evidenced by higher opioid prescription rates (than their peers in less 
competitive areas) in the months leading up to the transition. The theoretical implication 
of this finding is that the diffusion of practices, specifically through the imitation of 
competitors, is strongest in regions with high levels of competition. Practically speaking, 
while often believed to drive improvements in health outcomes (e.g. reduced cost, 
improved clinical outcomes), competition can also induce negative ramifications to long-
term patient outcomes. As such, policymakers should consider the potential consequences 
of publicly reporting customer satisfaction surveys which focus solely on short-term 
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metrics. One alternative may be to incorporate metrics which also account for patients' 
satisfaction with longer term outcomes, appropriately balancing public reporting to 
capture the short and long-term health interests of patients.  
Taken together, our results inform the discussion on the connections among 
workload, policy incentives, competition and opioid prescribing behavior within the U.S. 
healthcare system. Our findings also provide prescriptive implications to hospital 
managers, prescribers and policymakers about the relationship between operational, 
legislative and competitive factors and opioid prescription rates, and their contributing 
role to the opioid epidemic, in the U.S. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL SUPPLEMENT 
3.3.1 Variable Operationalization
The dependent variable in our study is an index composed of the average 
morphine milligram equivalent (MME) per prescription prescribed by prescriber i in 
month t.  Because each distinct National Drug Code number assigned to each prescription 
opioid varies in the drug type (e.g. buprenorphine, hydrocodone, oxycodone, etc.), 
physical form (e.g. tablet, capsule, solution) and strength per unit (e.g. number of 
milligrams), we followed guidelines established by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC 2016) to convert each opioid prescription in our data set to its 
corresponding MME. This conversion allows for accurate comparison of all opioid 
prescriptions (regardless of type, strength, or quantity of pills) on a standardized scale, 
resulting in a continuous variable indicating the average relative strength and volume of 
opioid prescriptions executed by each prescriber in each month of our data set, as 
outlined in Equation 3.1. 
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𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
=  
∑[𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 × #𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 × # 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 × 𝑀𝑀𝐸 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟]
[# 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠]
 
Equation 3.1 Opioid Prescription Rate Dependent Variable 
Since our analysis is concerned with how the VBP legislative policy affects the 
growth rate of opioid prescriptions, the independent variables of interest in our study are 
three time related covariates: Time, Transition, and Recovery.  The Time covariate 
represents the initial time trend before the introduction of the VBP legislative policy 
(January 2010 - June 2011). The Transition covariate represents the transition point at 
which the VBP policy change occurred (July 2011). The Recovery covariate captures the 
post-transition slope, in effect, the new time trend after the policy change (August 2011 - 
July 2013). Through introducing all three time covariates simultaneously into our model, 
we are able to accurately model the average opioid prescription rate for the prescribers in 
our data set leading up to the implementation of VBP legislation (Time) and compare the 
immediate change in opioid prescription rates following the introduction of VBP 
(Transition), along with the trend in opioid prescription rates post-implementation 
(Recovery), relative to the pre-policy trend.  
Additional independent variables of interest in our analysis are prescriber 
workload and the level of competition present in the prescriber's geographic area. Since a 
prescriber's workload can be influenced by all patients that are seen (not just those 
patients receiving an opioid prescription), we operationalize prescriber workload as the 
total number of prescriptions available to us in our data set. Therefore, workload is a 
normalized continuous measure representing the number of all controlled substance 
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prescriptions written by prescriber i in month t, divided by the total days available in 
month t (Equation 3.2). 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 =
∑[𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠]
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
 
Equation 3.2 Workload Variable 
Competition is a normalized continuous variable representing the relative level of 
access that patients have to prescribers, which we operationalize as the number of 
primary care and specialty physicians per 100,000 census population in the geographic 
service area where prescriber i is practicing in month t (Equation 3.3). 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
∑[𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠]
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Equation 3.3 Competition Variable 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 3.1 of the manuscript, we also include several control 
variables in our analysis to account for market and prescriber-level characteristics which 
may influence our dependent variable. A summary description of key model variables is 
displayed in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Description of Key Variables 
 
Variable Description Type Level of 
Analysis 
Opioid 
prescription 
rate 
Monthly index (by prescriber) of 
average MME per opioid 
prescription 
Dependent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Time Time trend prior VBP  Independent 
(Continuous) 
Macro 
Transition Transition point; equal to 0 prior to 
VBP, equal to 1 after VBP 
Independent 
(Categorical) 
Macro 
Recovery Time trend after the introduction of 
VBP 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Macro 
Workload Volume of all controlled substance 
prescriptions written by a prescriber 
divided by total days in month 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Competition Primary care and specialty 
physicians per 100,000 population 
in service area 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Market 
Medicare 
population 
Medicare beneficiaries per 100,000 
population in service area 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Market 
Public interest Relative level of public interest in 
opioids (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Macro 
Average age Average birth year of patients, 
among all patients receiving any 
controlled substance prescription 
from prescriber (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Percent 
female 
Percentage of female patients, 
among all patients receiving any 
controlled substance prescription 
from prescriber (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Percent 
Medicare 
Percentage of patients with 
Medicare insurance, among all 
patients receiving any controlled 
substance prescription from 
prescriber (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Percent 
Medicaid 
Percentage of patients with 
Medicaid insurance, among all 
patients receiving any controlled 
substance prescription from 
prescriber (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
Percent 
commercial 
Percentage of patients with 
commercial insurance, among all 
patients receiving any controlled 
substance prescription from 
prescriber (in month) 
Independent 
(Continuous) 
Prescriber 
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3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
We report summary statistics and correlation coefficients (with pairwise deletion) 
for the data sample employed to test the impact of Value Based Purchasing legislation, 
prescriber workload and competition on opioid prescribing rates in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, 
respectively. 
  Table 3.2 Summary statistics  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Opioid prescription rate 719.595 778.585 5 5297.667 
Time 21.334 12.413 0 42 
Transition 0.591 0.492 0 1 
Recovery 7.184 8.146 0 24 
Workload 1.227 1.938 0.032 57.032 
Competition 310.796 210.990 0 1432.847 
Medicare population 18854.740 12462.130 58 62373 
Public interest 31.141 5.200 21 42 
Average age 1955.717 41.309 0 2012 
Percent female 0.548 0.281 0 1 
Percent Medicare 0.065 0.146 0 1 
Percent Medicaid 0.037 0.109 0 1 
Percent Commercial 0.505 0.363 0 1 
    Observations = 68,150 physician-month observations
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Pairwise Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Opioid prescription 
rate
....1.000
4. Medicare population 0.011* − 0.014* 0.108* ....1.000
7. Percent female − 0.031* 0.014* − 0.004.. 0.013* 0.000.. 0.032* ....1.000
8. Percent Medicare 0.095* − 0.010* − 0.028* − 0.004.. 0.125* − 0.077* − 0.012* ....1.000
9. Percent Medicaid − 0.008* − 0.025* − 0.030* − 0.023* 0.059* 0.010* ....0.000 − 0.004 ....1.000
10. Percent Commercial 0.023* 0.023* 0.000.. 0.018* 0.296* − 0.018* 0.030* − 0.072 − 0.063* 1.000
* p < 0.05
....1.000
5. Public Interest
6. Average age − 0.044* 0.016* 0.007.. 0.002.. 0.052*
− 0.005.. − 0.002.. − 0.003.. 0.000.. ....1.000
3. Competition − 0.023* − 0.078* ....1.000
2. Workload 0.258* ....1.000
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3.3.3 Results 
Examining the impact of the Value Based Purchasing policy on opioid 
prescription rates, we employ the following fixed effects model, reflected by Equation 
3.4, in which 𝛾  represents the control variables listed in Table A.1 and 𝛼  represents 
prescriber fixed effects. 
𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
= 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾 + 𝛼
+ 𝜀  
Equation 3.4 Fixed Effects Empirical Model 
In Table 3.4 we list the parameter coefficients for the fixed effects analysis of the 
introduction of VBP legislation (2), the moderating impact of prescriber workload (3), 
and the moderating impact of competition (4). We also list coefficients for a base model 
(1) without our coefficients of interest included. The results of the fixed effects analysis 
for the introduction of VBP (2) show a significant negative slope for the time trend prior 
to the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = − 9.519, p-value = 0.000), indicating 
that opioid prescription rates were consistently decreasing prior to the start of the initial 
VBP performance period (July 2011). Further, the significant positive coefficient on the 
transition point at the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = 49.089, p-value = 
0.000) indicates an immediate increase in opioid prescription rates (i.e. increase in the 
intercept) at the onset of the VBP performance period (July 2011). Lastly, the positive 
and statistically significant recovery slope for the time trend after the introduction of 
VBP legislation (coefficient = 9.606, p-value = 0.000) indicates a slight growth trend in 
opioid prescription growth rates following the onset of the initial VBP performance 
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period. Taken together, the results of the fixed effects analysis (2) indicate that the 
introduction of VBP legislation is associated with an immediate increase in opioid 
prescription rates, followed by a slight, but stable, growth trend. Further, our results show 
that the VBP legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid 
prescription rates seen before VBP legislation took effect.  
The results of the fixed effects analysis in the prescriber workload moderated 
model (3) follow a similar trend to that seen in the main model (2), albeit with differential 
impacts of prescriber workload on the pre-VBP and post-VBP slope trends. For the 
prescriber workload moderated model, high prescriber workload reflects a prescriber 
operating at the 75th percentile of workload amongst all prescribers in our sample, 
whereas low prescriber workload represents a prescriber operating at the 25th percentile 
of workload. The results of the prescriber workload moderated model (3) suggest that, 
although they begin the study period at higher opioid prescription rates, prescribers with a 
higher workload experience a more negative slope for the time trend prior to the 
introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = − 0.759, p-value = 0.007) than their peers 
with low workload, indicating some convergence in prescription rates between the two 
levels of workload leading up to the start of the initial VBP performance period (although 
rates for high workload prescribers always remain higher). The insignificant interaction 
between prescriber workload and the transition point at the introduction of VBP 
legislation (coefficient = 5.488, p-value = 0.151) indicates that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the increase seen between the two levels of workload (i.e. no 
differential change in intercept), at the onset of the VBP performance period. Lastly, the 
statistically significant positive coefficient for the interaction between prescriber 
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workload and the recovery time trend after the introduction of VBP legislation 
(coefficient = 0.661, p-value = 0.043) indicates a significantly higher slope trend in 
opioid prescription rates for prescribers with a high workload, as opposed to their peers 
with a low workload, following the onset of the initial VBP performance period. Taken 
together, the results of the prescriber workload moderated model (3) indicate that, on 
average, higher levels of prescriber workload are associated with higher opioid 
prescription rates. Further, our results confirm the impact of the VBP legislation seen in 
the main model (2), regardless of the level of prescriber workload, in which the VBP 
legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid prescription rates seen 
before VBP legislation took effect.  
The results of the fixed effects analysis in the competition moderated model (4) 
also follow a similar trend to that seen in the main model (2), albeit with differential 
impacts of competition on the pre-VBP and post-VBP slope trends. For the competition 
moderated model, high competition reflects geographic areas in which the volume of 
total prescribers was at the 75th percentile amongst all geographic areas in our sample, 
whereas low competition represents geographic areas in which the volume of total 
prescribers was at the 25th percentile amongst all geographic areas in our sample. The 
results of the competition moderated model suggest that, although they begin the study 
period at lower opioid prescription rates, prescribers practicing in geographic areas with 
high competition experience a less negative slope for the time trend prior to the 
introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = 0.008, p-value = 0.001) than their peers 
practicing in geographic areas with low competition, ultimately leading to higher average 
opioid prescription rates for prescribers operating in highly competitive areas, even 
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before the introduction of VBP legislation. The insignificant interaction between 
competition and the transition point at the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = 
− 0.024, p-value = 0.474) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in 
the increase seen in opioid prescription rates between the two levels of competition (i.e. 
no differential change in intercept), at the onset of the VBP performance period. Lastly, 
the statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction between competition 
and the recovery time trend after the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = − 
0.008, p-value = 0.005) indicates a significantly higher slope trend in opioid prescription 
rates for prescribers practicing in areas with high levels of competition, as opposed to 
their peers practicing in areas with low levels of competition, following the onset of the 
initial VBP performance period. Taken together, the results of the competition moderated 
model (4) indicate that, on average, higher levels of competition are associated with 
higher opioid prescription rates. Further, our results confirm the impact of the VBP 
legislation seen in the main model (2), regardless of the level of competition, in which the 
VBP legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid prescription rates 
seen before VBP legislation took effect. 
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        Table 3.4 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients 
 
 
Base 
Model 
 
 
(1) 
Introduction 
of 
VBP 
 
(2) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Prescriber 
Workload  
(3) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Competition 
 
(4) 
Time 
 
– 9.519*** 
(0.512) 
− 8.565*** 
(0.622) 
− 12.073*** 
(0.906) 
Transition 
 
49.089*** 
 (8.688) 
42.130*** 
(9.872) 
56.329*** 
(13.419) 
Recovery 
 
9.606*** 
(0.681) 
8.783*** 
(0.791) 
12.062*** 
(1.111) 
Workload 
 
13.436*** 
(2.489) 
22.619*** 
(3.856) 
13.432*** 
(2.488) 
Time x 
Workload   
− 0.759*** 
(0.283) 
 
Transition x 
Workload   
5.488 
(3.825) 
 
Recovery x 
Workload   
    0.661** 
(0.327) 
 
Competition 
 
– 0.009 
(0.020) 
– 0.009 
 (0.020) 
− 0.114*** 
(0.031) 
Time x 
Competition   
 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Transition x 
Competition   
 − 0.024 
(0.033) 
Recovery x 
Competition   
 − 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Medicare 
population 
− 0.001* 
(0.001) 
− 0.001** 
(0.001) 
− 0.001** 
(0.001) 
− 0.001** 
(0.001) 
Public interest − 2.232*** 
(0.351) 
− 1.130*** 
(0.382) 
− 1.130*** 
(0.382) 
− 1.123*** 
(0.382) 
Average age − 0.020 
(0.043) 
0.018 
(0.043) 
0.017 
(0.043) 
0.019 
(0.043) 
Percent female − 42.466*** 
(7.443) 
− 43.137*** 
(7.418) 
− 43.196*** 
(7.417) 
− 43.026*** 
(7.417) 
Percent 
Medicare 
110.980*** 
(13.121) 
83.386*** 
(14.048) 
83.432*** 
(14.047) 
83.021*** 
(14.048) 
Percent 
Medicaid 
16.484 
(17.325) 
– 29.415 
(18.013) 
– 29.694* 
(18.013) 
– 30.252* 
(18.013) 
Percent 
Commercial 
71.325*** 
(5.582) 
36.227*** 
(7.247) 
35.907*** 
(7.248) 
35.844*** 
(7.246) 
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Observations 68,150 68,150 68,150 68,150 
R2 0.6973 0.6994 0.6994 0.6995 
Log 
Likelihood 
− 509689.2 − 509451.5 − 509446.5 − 509439.3 
AIC 1019394 1018929 1018925 1018911 
BIC 1019467 1019048 1019071 1019057 
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in 
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
3.3.4 Robustness Checks 
Due to multiple changes occurring in the U.S. healthcare environment during our 
study period, it is possible that the significant association between the implementation of 
VBP and change in the rate of opioid prescribing could be due to alternative 
environmental factors. To help rule out the possibility that other events are confounding 
our findings, we conduct multiple “placebo” tests, or falsification tests (Nicolae et al. 
2016), in which we select other time points in our study and statistically test whether 
opioid prescription rates increased at these pseudo-transition points. In doing so, we are 
attempting to rule out the argument that the VBP transition point was incorrectly 
specified in our main model, thus leading to conclusions that are attributable to a false 
positive. In our first placebo test, we selected a pseudo-transition point to test whether 
other VBP related programs introduced in 2011 had a significant impact on opioid 
prescribing rates. When choosing an appropriate 2011 pseudo-transition point to test, we 
wanted to select a month which occurred prior to the transition point hypothesized in our 
main analysis (July 2011), but also occurred far enough into the year such that it could 
reasonably pick up the effects of environmental changes introduced in 2011, without 
mistakenly capturing residual effects from 2010. The placebo test results for the selected 
pseudo-transition point in April 2011 were not statistically significant (coefficient = 
0.248, p-value = 0.976), lending support that other changes occurring in the U.S. 
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healthcare environment in 2011 are not likely confounding the effects found in our main 
analysis. Taking a different approach of selecting a pseudo-transition point, in which we 
are not motivated by specific environmental changes, we chose to test the midpoint of the 
post-VBP implementation period in our main analysis. The placebo test results for the 
July 2012 pseudo-transition point were not statistically significant (coefficient = − 2.764; 
p-value = 0.735), lending further support that our model is not incorrectly specified. As 
another approach of selecting a pseudo-transition point, we wanted to isolate a feature of 
the ACA which could practically lead to changes in hospital-based opioid prescribing 
rates, particularly one related to the recent (at the time of our study period) emphasis 
placed on electronic health records (EHR). As such, we test a time point that revolves 
around the introduction of regulations surrounding EHR adoption and information 
exchange, the first of which took effect in October 2012 (National Academy of Sciences 
2014). Since EHRs were designed with the intention of reducing administrative burdens, 
reducing medical errors and improving the quality of care, it is plausible that more 
accurate and reliable storage and exchange of patient health information could lead to 
changes in hospital-based opioid prescribing patterns. The placebo test results for this 
October 2012 pseudo-transition point were not statistically significant (coefficient = 
7.244, p-value = 0.371), indicating that the implementation of the EHR requirement did 
not result in sudden changes to hospital-based opioid prescribing rates. We also 
considered the impact that the expansion of insurance access, via insurance marketplaces, 
may have induced on opioid prescribing. Open enrollment via Health Insurance 
Marketplaces, however, did not begin until October 1, 2013, which was two months after 
the end of our study period (National Academy of Sciences 2014). Therefore, although 
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we were unable to conduct a placebo test for this ACA initiative, any impact from this 
initiative should not confound our findings since it occurred chronologically after our 
study period. Taken together, these results provide support that our main analysis 
findings are not attributable to incorrect model specification.  
As noted in Chapter 3.1, there are several ways in which a physician could 
increase the level of opioids prescribed to a patient in response to VBP legislation (e.g. 
change in the type of opioid prescribed, increase in strength per pill, increase in quantity 
of pills). The dependent variable in our main analysis, MME per prescription, accounts 
not only for the differences across disparate types of opioids, but also incorporates the 
strength of each pill prescribed and the total quantity of pills prescribed in each 
prescription. To further explore the nuances of how prescribers are altering opioid 
prescribing behavior in response to VBP legislation, we selected alternative dependent 
variables which would provide insight into whether prescribers are increasing the 
strength or quantity of opioids prescribed. To test whether strength increased following 
the introduction of VBP legislation, we replaced our primary dependent variable, MME 
per prescription, with an alternative operationalization, MME per day, which is 
equivalent to the MME per prescription divided by the number of days of supply intended 
for the prescription. Through normalizing the MME calculation by the prescriber's 
intended length (i.e. days' supply) of the prescription, we can analyze whether the 
strength of opioid prescriptions is increasing following the introduction of VBP. The 
results of this test (reported in Table 3.5) are largely consistent with our main analysis 
and confirm that the strength of opioid per day within a prescription was decreasing prior 
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to the introduction of VBP and increased immediately at the onset of VBP.14 To test 
whether the number of pills increased following the introduction of VBP legislation, we 
replaced our primary dependent variable, MME per prescription, with the quantity of pills 
prescribed per opioid prescription. Once again, the results of this test confirm the impact 
of VBP found in our main analysis. Specifically, the quantity of pills per prescription was 
decreasing in the time leading up to VBP and increased immediately at the onset of VBP. 
Taken together, this robustness check confirms our main findings while also providing 
statistical support that both the intended strength per day and overall quantity of pills per 
prescription contributed to the increase in opioid prescription rates following VBP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 We note that the scale of the coefficients for each time covariate is smaller due to the 
nature of the dependent variable, however, the directionality and significance remain 
consistent with those reported for the main analysis. 
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Table 3.5 Alternative Dependent Variables 
 
 
Strength per Day 
 (5) 
Quantity of Pills 
 (6) 
Time – 0.518*** 
(0.031) 
– 0.062** 
(0.025) 
Transition 1.117** 
 (0.529) 
1.674*** 
 (0.424) 
Recovery 0.492*** 
(0.042) 
0.009 
(0.033) 
Workload 1.033*** 
(0.151) 
0.154 
(0.121) 
Competition 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicare population − 0.000 
(0.000) 
− 0.000 
(0.000) 
Public interest 0.002 
(0.023) 
− 0.017 
(0.019) 
Average age − 0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Percent female − 2.697*** 
(0.452) 
− 1.432*** 
(0.362) 
Percent Medicare − 2.384*** 
(0.855) 
4.660*** 
(0.685) 
Percent Medicaid − 4.503*** 
(1.096) 
0.436 
(0.879) 
Percent Commercial − 0.110 
(0.441) 
0.752** 
(0.353) 
   
Observations 68,040 68,150 
R2 0.3946 0.5730 
Log Likelihood − 318131.4 − 303594.7 
AIC 636288.9 607215.5 
BIC 636407.5 607334.2 
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in 
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Due to the growing proportion of surgeries that are conducted in an outpatient 
setting (Steiner et al. 2017), it is plausible that the surgeons included in our data set are 
executing some of their prescriptions in an ambulatory setting. If this were the case, the 
patients receiving these prescriptions would not be eligible to complete a patient 
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satisfaction survey (because they did not qualify as a hospital inpatient), potentially 
biasing our results. To rule out any possibility that prescriptions received by ambulatory 
surgery patients are confounding our findings, we excluded all surgeons from our data set 
and repeated our analysis. Results from this restricted data sample are presented in Table 
3.6 and remain largely consistent with the findings in our main model. Although the scale 
of coefficients and in some cases, level of statistical significance, vary slightly from the 
main results in Table 3.4, the directionality and relative scale (when plotted) remain 
consistent, thus confirming that our findings are not confounded by the possible presence 
of ambulatory surgery patients in our data. 
    Table 3.6 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients - Excluding Surgeons 
 
 
Introduction 
of 
VBP 
 
(7) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Prescriber 
Workload  
(8) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Competition 
 
(9) 
Time – 12.636*** 
(1.214) 
− 11.650*** 
(1.451) 
− 15.904*** 
(2.166) 
Transition 66.255*** 
 (20.006) 
57.805** 
(22.717) 
76.154** 
(31.837) 
Recovery 12.727*** 
(1.601) 
11.654*** 
(1.844) 
16.148*** 
(2.663) 
Workload 25.332*** 
(8.972) 
32.884*** 
(11.923) 
25.595*** 
(8.973) 
Time x Workload 
 
− 0.900 
(0.724) 
 
Transition x 
Workload  
7.556 
(9.891) 
 
Recovery x 
Workload  
0.985 
(0.843) 
 
Competition – 0.029 
(0.052) 
– 0.030 
 (0.052) 
− 0.158** 
(0.077) 
Time x 
Competition  
 0.011* 
(0.006) 
Transition x 
Competition  
 − 0.032 
(0.080) 
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Recovery x 
Competition  
 − 0.011 
(0.007) 
Medicare 
population 
− 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
− 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Public interest − 1.718* 
(0.909) 
− 1.721* 
(0.909) 
− 1.708* 
(0.909) 
Average age 0.042 
(0.094) 
0.041 
(0.094) 
0.041 
(0.094) 
Percent female − 54.095*** 
(14.101) 
− 54.131*** 
(14.101) 
− 53.656*** 
(14.104) 
Percent Medicare 99.936*** 
(25.326) 
100.076*** 
(25.330) 
99.708*** 
(25.329) 
Percent Medicaid – 23.271 
(34.875) 
– 23.441 
(34.880) 
– 23.870 
(34.875) 
Percent 
Commercial 
44.875*** 
(15.431) 
44.562*** 
(15.442) 
44.246*** 
(15.433) 
    
Observations 24,739 24,739 24,739 
R2 0.5775 0.5775 0.5776 
Log Likelihood − 193782.9 − 193782.1 − 193780.1 
AIC 387591.8 387596.2 387592.2 
BIC 387697.3 387726.1 387722 
Models include fixed effects for 965 prescribers; standard errors in           
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;                
* significant at 10% 
 
Additionally, to further validate our findings, we tested for the impact of VBP 
legislation in a group of prescribers which are not hospital based and thus do not have 
their patient satisfaction scores publicly reported or tied to reimbursement. Therefore, this 
population of prescribers should not have experienced changes in opioid prescribing 
behavior associated with VBP legislation. To do so, we executed our main model on a 
population of office-based prescribers from our study state which often conduct clinical 
procedures in the office setting and may prescribe pain medication post-procedure -- 
dermatologists. As displayed in model (10) of Table 3.7, all three time covariates for 
dermatologists are not statistically significant, indicating that this group of prescribers did 
not experience changes in opioid prescribing behavior associated with VBP. In model 
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(11) of Table 3.7, we display results from another sample of office-based prescribers, 
pediatricians. Although this group of office-based prescribers exhibits a statistically 
significant negative opioid prescribing trend prior to the introduction of VBP, the VBP 
transition point is not statistically significant (i.e. no intercept change), indicating that this 
group of prescribers did not experience immediate changes in opioid prescribing 
associated with VBP. We also apply our fixed effects longitudinal model to general 
dentists, who also conduct procedures in an office-based setting and may prescribe pain 
medication post-procedure. These results are displayed in model (12) in Table 3.7 and 
confirm that VBP is not associated with an immediate significant impact on opioid 
prescription rates. Although the initial Time trend and Recovery covariate for dentists 
indicate significance, the magnitude of the coefficients relative to those in our main 
analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4) is extremely low, indicating very little change in the 
opioid prescription rate month over month. We also conducted this analysis on an 
expanded population of dentists (not reported in Table 3.7) to include dental specialties 
(for example, endodontics and periodontics), resulting in similar findings of no 
immediate impact of VBP on opioid prescription rates. 
Lastly, in model (13) of Table 3.7, we examine a group of prescribers practicing 
in the hospital setting but which are not financially incentivized to place an emphasis on 
patient satisfaction as a result of the VBP program. Recall that we excluded emergency 
medicine physicians from our main analysis because patient satisfaction surveys (tied to 
reimbursement) are not administered to patients discharged directly from the emergency 
room. Notice that this sample of prescribers also experiences a statistically significant 
negative opioid prescribing trend in the study period leading up to the introduction of the 
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VBP program, however it is at a rate which is (approximately 95%) less than that 
experienced by inpatient hospital-based prescribers in our main analysis (Model (2) in 
Table 3.4). Further, although emergency medicine physicians experience a slight increase 
in opioid prescribing behavior at the onset of the VBP program, it is markedly (greater 
than 80%) less than that experienced by inpatient hospital-based prescribers in our main 
analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4). It is important to note, however, that emergency 
medicine physicians do not experience a prolonged increase in opioid prescribing after 
the introduction of VBP, as the post-VBP recovery period is not statistically significant. 
A possible explanation for this finding may be the influence of social and spatial 
proximity on diffusion of prescribing practices between physicians in the same physical 
setting (Angst et al. 2010). Combined, these findings provide support for our conclusion 
that substantial changes in opioid prescribing associated with the introduction of the VBP 
program are limited to prescribers practicing in inpatient hospital settings. 
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     Table 3.7 Alternative Specialty Prescribers 
 
 
Dermatology 
 
(10) 
Pediatrics 
 
(11) 
 
General 
Dentists 
 (12) 
Emergency 
Medicine 
 (13) 
Time     – 1.822 
(1.815) 
    – 4.667*** 
(1.674) 
– 0.549*** 
(0.188) 
– 0.498** 
(0.233) 
Transition − 27.185 
 (29.472) 
6.231 
 (27.854) 
– 0.905 
(2.990) 
8.489** 
 (3.941) 
Recovery 1.924 
(2.317) 
7.665*** 
(2.208) 
0.872*** 
(0.236) 
0.066 
(0.307) 
Workload 142.948** 
(61.509) 
71.482** 
(18.370) 
0.913 
(3.846) 
14.153*** 
(1.726) 
Competition 0.016 
(0.085) 
− 0.185** 
(0.073) 
− 0.001 
(0.009) 
− 0.006 
(0.010) 
Medicare 
population 
    − 0.001 
(0.003) 
    − 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    0.000** 
(0.000) 
Public interest     − 0.034 
(1.378) 
       0.623 
(1.305) 
− 0.006 
(0.140) 
0.079 
(0.172) 
Average age     − 0.123 
 (0.088) 
    − 0.146** 
 (0.067) 
− 0.004 
(0.009) 
− 0.012 
 (0.017) 
Percent female − 35.631** 
(16.418) 
     38.301*** 
(14.094) 
1.264 
(1.859) 
− 23.237*** 
(1.780) 
Percent 
Medicare 
− 82.320** 
(38.782) 
264.565** 
(55.030) 
18.584*** 
(5.986) 
22.212* 
(11.432) 
Percent 
Medicaid 
42.415 
 (53.739) 
− 92.745*** 
 (30.184) 
− 6.168 
(5.863) 
− 33.781*** 
 (9.683) 
Percent 
Commercial 
− 4.264*** 
 (19.304) 
− 22.731 
 (18.683) 
0.135 
(2.019) 
14.224*** 
 (3.852) 
     
Observations 3,273 8,201 24,871 28,490 
R2 0.5665 0.5132 0.3369 0.4442 
Log Likelihood − 23627.5 − 62116 − 148450.3 − 177892.2 
AIC 47280.9 124258 296926.6 355810.5 
BIC 47630.2 124349.2 297032.2 355917.8 
Model (10) includes fixed effects for 167 prescribers; Model (11) includes fixed 
effects for 672 prescribers; Model (12) includes fixed effects for 944 prescribers; 
Model (13) includes fixed effects for 814 prescribers; standard errors in 
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
We also ran our models with an alternative operationalization of competition and 
report these results in Table 3.8. We replaced our existing measure of competition, the 
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total number of physicians per 100,000 census population in the service area, with the 
total number of hospitals in the hospital service area (Dartmouth Atlas 2019).15 Although 
the scale of coefficients and in some cases, level of statistical significance, vary slightly 
from the moderated coefficients in Table 3.4, results for this alternative 
operationalization remain largely consistent with our main findings. 
Table 3.8 Alternative Operationalization of Competition 
 
 
Introduction of 
VBP 
 
 
(14) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Prescriber 
Workload  
(15) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Competition 
 
(16) 
Time – 9.192*** 
(0.811) 
− 8.184*** 
(1.038) 
− 10.367*** 
(1.033) 
Transition 51.274*** 
 (12.834) 
44.451*** 
(14.750) 
51.191** 
(15.098) 
Recovery 9.093*** 
(1.064) 
8.352*** 
(1.266) 
10.913*** 
(1.287) 
Workload 25.806** 
(11.651) 
37.227*** 
(14.257) 
25.853*** 
(11.659) 
Time x Workload 
 
− 0.796* 
(0.476) 
 
Transition x 
Workload  
5.426 
(3.939) 
 
Recovery x 
Workload  
0.585 
(0.472) 
 
Competition 1.986 
(3.355) 
2.000 
 (3.353) 
− 1.306 
(0.077) 
Time x 
Competition  
 0.329* 
(0.173) 
Transition x 
Competition  
 0.025 
(2.303) 
Recovery x 
Competition  
 − 0.509** 
(0.206) 
 
15 The data set forth at time of publication was obtained from Dartmouth Atlas Data 
website, which is funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Health Economics 
Common Fund Program through an award [U-01 Supplement Award, National Institutes 
of Health Common Fund (3U01AG046830-03S1)]. 
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Medicare 
population 
− 0.001* 
(0.001) 
− 0.001* 
(0.001) 
− 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
Public interest − 1.139*** 
(0.367) 
− 1.137*** 
(0.367) 
− 1.138*** 
(0.367) 
Average age 0.007 
(0.041) 
0.005 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.041) 
Percent female − 41.770*** 
(15.200) 
− 41.905*** 
(15.204) 
− 42.010*** 
(15.212) 
Percent Medicare 101.898*** 
(30.878) 
102.250*** 
(30.864) 
101.928*** 
(30.873) 
Percent Medicaid – 36.033 
(28.757) 
– 36.412 
(28.777) 
– 35.786 
(28.794) 
Percent 
Commercial 
40.417*** 
(12.286) 
40.087*** 
(12.296) 
40.475*** 
(12.276) 
    
Observations 66,181 66,181 66,181 
Alternative operationalization of competition is time invariant, therefore 
models in this table include random effects; clustered standard errors for 
2,178 prescribers in parentheses;  
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Disparate proportions of primary care versus specialty physicians in an area may 
induce differential influence on the relationship between the competition present in an 
area and opioid prescription rates. That is, it is possible that the effects of competition on 
opioid prescription rates are driven more by the presence of primary care physicians as 
opposed to specialty physicians, or vice versa. To investigate this possibility further, we 
conduct a supplementary analysis to analyze whether the moderating impact of 
competition on opioid prescription rates is driven by a specific type of competition 
(primary care versus specialists) and present these results in Table 3.9. To do so, we 
disaggregate the competition variable in the primary analysis such that competition is no 
longer represented by one variable (representing all prescribers in a geographic area), but 
instead is represented by two variables, one reflecting the volume of primary care 
prescribers in a geographic area and the other representing the volume of specialty 
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physicians in a geographic area. The results in the main model with disaggregated 
competition (17) produce coefficients comparable to those in the main model (2) 
previously reported in Table 3.4, indicating that splitting competition into two types has 
no significant impact on the main findings for the introduction of VBP.  
We then interact the level of primary care competition in a geographic area with 
each of the time covariates in our model (18) to determine whether the moderating impact 
of primary care competition is driving the results seen when we previously investigated 
the moderating impact of total competition (Model (4) in Table 3.4) on opioid prescribing 
rates. Results for the moderating impact of primary care competition in a geographic area 
(18) are comparable to those produced when operationalizing competition as the total 
competition in a geographic area (Model (4) in Table 3.4). Similarly, we also interact the 
level of specialist competition in a geographic area with each of the time covariates in our 
model (19) to determine whether the moderating impact of specialist competition is 
driving the results seen when we previously investigated the moderating impact of total 
competition (Model (4) in Table 3.4) on opioid prescribing rates. Results for the 
moderating impact of specialist competition in a geographic area (19) are also 
comparable to those produced when operationalizing competition as the total competition 
in a geographic area (Model (4) in Table 3.4). Taken together, this finding indicates that 
primary care and specialist competition in a geographic area are both contributing to the 
overall moderating impact of competition on opioid prescription rates. 
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 Table 3.9 Disaggregated Competition Models 
 
 
VBP Introduction 
with 
Disaggregated 
Competition 
(17) 
Moderating 
Impact of Primary 
Care Competition 
  
(18) 
Moderating 
Impact of 
Specialist 
Competition 
(19) 
Time – 9.521*** 
(0.512) 
− 12.629*** 
(1.088) 
− 11.724*** 
(0.830) 
Transition 49.159*** 
 (8.688) 
46.602*** 
(15.688) 
58.541*** 
(12.469) 
Recovery 9.604*** 
(0.681) 
12.791*** 
(1.313) 
11.649*** 
(1.026) 
Workload 13.444*** 
(2.489) 
13.440*** 
(2.488) 
13.437*** 
(2.489) 
Primary Physician 
Competition 
0.148 
(0.102) 
− 0.299** 
(0.136) 
0.147 
(0.102) 
Time x Primary 
Competition  
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
 
Transition x Primary 
Competition  
0.022 
(0.128) 
 
Recovery x Primary 
Competition  
− 0.031*** 
(0.011) 
 
Specialist Physician 
Competition 
– 0.066 
(0.042) 
– 0.066 
(0.042) 
− 0.194*** 
(0.051) 
Time x Specialist 
Competition  
 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Transition x Specialist 
Competition  
 − 0.045 
(0.043) 
Recovery x Specialist 
Competition  
 − 0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Medicare population − 0.001* 
(0.001) 
− 0.001* 
(0.001) 
− 0.001* 
(0.001) 
Public interest − 1.123*** 
(0.382) 
− 1.114*** 
(0.382) 
− 1.117*** 
(0.382) 
Average age 0.018 
(0.043) 
0.019 
(0.043) 
0.018 
(0.043) 
Percent female − 43.130*** 
(7.418) 
− 42.994*** 
(7.416) 
− 43.031*** 
(7.417) 
Percent Medicare 83.400*** 
(14.048) 
82.873*** 
(14.047) 
83.116*** 
(14.048) 
Percent Medicaid − 29.296 
 (18.013) 
− 31.021* 
 (18.014) 
− 29.837* 
 (18.013) 
Percent Commercial 36.319*** 
(7.247) 
35.617*** 
(7.247) 
36.023*** 
(7.247) 
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Observations 68,150 68,150 68,150 
R2 0.6994 0.6995 0.6995 
Log Likelihood − 509450.3 − 509433.8 − 509439.9 
AIC 1018929 1018902 1018914 
BIC 1019056 1019057 1019069 
     Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in parentheses;  
     *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Although VBP legislation and competition are exogenous variables that occur 
independent of the prescriber, we recognize that prescriber workload is susceptible to 
endogeneity concerns. Therefore, we conduct a series of instrumental variable regressions 
(results reported in Table 3.10) in which we instrument prescriber workload using both 
external and generated instruments. In Model (20), we use a lagged measure of prescriber 
workload as our external instrument, resulting in findings that are consistent in 
directionality, statistical significance, and magnitude with the findings reported in our 
main analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4). We also conduct post-estimation statistical tests 
for overidentification, underidentification, and weak identification, with each test 
validating that we have selected an appropriate instrumental variable. As added 
robustness, we also ran an instrumental variable regression combining the use of our 
selected external instrument with instruments generated following Lewbel's method 
(Baum and Schaffer 2012), with results reported in Model (21) of Table 3.10. These 
findings are consistent in directionality and statistical significance with the findings 
reported in our main analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4) albeit with some differences in 
magnitude of the coefficients. Once again, we conducted post-estimation statistical tests 
for overidentification, underidentification, and weak identification, with each test 
validating that we have selected appropriate instrumental variables. We note that slight 
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discrepancies in sample size exist between these models and our main model (Model (2) 
in Table 3.4) due to differences in estimation techniques and the incorporation of a 
lagged variable (which is not available for all prescribers in our dataset). As further 
assurance that the presence of the workload variable is not inappropriately biasing our 
findings related to the impact of the VBP program, we have also run our main model 
without the inclusion of the workload variable; empirical results for the three time 
covariates remain consistent in statistical significance, directionality, and magnitude with 
those previously reported. Taken together, these findings lend support that our main 
findings are robust to potential endogeneity related to prescriber workload. 
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   Table 3.10 Instrumental Variable Regression Models 
 
 
External 
Instruments 
 (20) 
Generated and 
External Instruments 
 (21) 
Time – 10.579*** 
(0.539) 
– 9.208*** 
(0.959) 
Transition 55.650*** 
 (8.612) 
120.375*** 
 (14.594) 
Recovery 10.664*** 
(0.708) 
4.332*** 
(1.213) 
Workload 19.003*** 
(3.138) 
104.709*** 
(1.530) 
Competition − 0.011 
(0.020) 
− 0.004 
(0.014) 
Medicare population − 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Public interest − 1.022*** 
(0.372) 
− 0.811 
(0.667) 
Average age − 0.029 
(0.047) 
− 0.876*** 
(0.081) 
Percent female − 43.887*** 
(8.076) 
− 112.314*** 
(11.231) 
Percent Medicare 61.109*** 
(15.042) 
622.327*** 
(23.141) 
Percent Medicaid − 51.645*** 
(19.289) 
21.746 
(30.241) 
Percent Commercial 38.464*** 
(7.433) 
71.935*** 
(10.724) 
   
Observations 61,145 61,211 
R2 0.0117 0.5188 
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors 
in parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;            
* significant at 10% 
 
Lastly, in an effort to examine whether the VBP program had a similar effect on 
opioid prescribing rates in other geographic areas (beyond the state selected for our main 
analysis) we acquired and analyzed data from an additional state PDMP, from a 
substantially different region of the U.S. than our primary sample. We note that state 
PDMPs have disparate laws and regulations with respect to data sharing for researchers. 
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As a result, data acquired from this additional state did not enable for direct matching of 
variables with the data source used in the main analysis and also required that we 
examine a broader population of prescribers (aggregate samples of hospital-based and 
office-based prescribers). However, we were able to recreate the three time covariates of 
interest to match the new sample with our primary sample. Results for the time covariate 
comparison between these two samples are presented in Table 3.11 and indicate that the 
introduction of the VBP program is associated with similar changes in opioid prescribing 
across both samples.16 
   Table 3.11 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients – State Comparison 
 
 
Main Analysis 
 (22) 
Additional Analysis 
 (21) 
Time – 5.689*** 
(0.073) 
– 10.032*** 
(0.184) 
Transition 12.965*** 
 (1.010) 
31.249*** 
 (2.476) 
Recovery 6.997*** 
(0.086) 
11.385*** 
(0.219) 
Average age − 0.039*** 
(0.004) 
3.064** 
(0.069) 
   
Observations 3,351,440 636,372 
R2 0.7758 0.7418 
Model (22) include fixed effects for 154,717 prescribers; Model (23) 
include fixed effects for 69,390 prescribers; standard errors in 
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10% 
 
 
16 When combined with the analysis referenced in Footnote 4, the authors empirically 
validated statistically similar opioid prescribing trends for approximately 20% of states in 
the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates the impact of operational performance incentive 
programs, implemented under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 
2010, on the operating responses of hospitals and physicians. The ACA launched a 
significant transformation in the US healthcare industry through the shift from a fee-for-
service to a pay-for-performance environment (Werner et al. 2011). This reformed 
service and reimbursement model encouraged hospitals to invest a significant amount of 
financial and human resources to meet new standards related to clinical and experiential 
quality (Merlino and Raman 2013).  
Leveraging a longitudinal investigation of hospitals’ operating environments, this 
dissertation reveals specific factors which influence the degree to which hospitals invest 
in compliance with the new operational performance standards mandated by the ACA. 
Findings indicate that political support for the ACA in the area where a hospital operates 
renders a hospital more likely to invest in complying with performance measures related 
to experiential quality, and that this investment appears to occur at a faster rate than 
hospitals operating in areas that do not express political support for the ACA. 
Interestingly, the role of political support for the ACA is only relevant for the non-
traditional measure of experiential quality, as political support for the ACA is not 
relevant hospital investments to comply with the traditional measure of clinical quality. 
Findings also provide evidence of the substantial influence of competitor actions on 
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hospitals’ likelihood to invest in complying with both experiential and clinical quality 
measures. Further, the relationship between political support for the ACA and 
experiential quality is dominated by high levels of competitor action, supporting the 
notion that hospitals view competitor actions as more salient than the level of political 
support for the ACA in their operating environments. 
Motivated by the ACA’s focus on experiential quality and the severity of the 
opioid epidemic in progress in the US, this dissertation also examines the impact of 
financially incentivizing hospitals and physicians to improve experiential quality, and the 
unintended impact on opioid prescribing rates. Findings indicate that hospital-based 
opioid prescribing rates significantly increased following the introduction of the Value 
Based Purchasing (VBP) program, which was the operational mechanism linking hospital 
and physician reimbursement to experiential quality performance. Empirical findings 
further reveal that the increase in opioid prescribing rates associated with VBP are 
exacerbated by high levels of market competition and prescriber workload.  
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation provide considerable support 
for the significant influence of several factors within hospital and physician operating 
environments, and their joint impact on the operational responses of hospitals and 
physicians to the ACA. This dissertation informs the discussion on the relative 
effectiveness of ACA implementation in the US healthcare industry as well as its 
intersection with the ongoing operations of hospitals and physicians. 
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